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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis analyzes state utilization of private military and security 
companies (PMSC), using United States Government (USG) outsourcing during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as a case study to investigate how PMSCs 
influence interstate conflicts.  Cost savings are a primary justification for 
outsourcing.  Government sources also suggest wartime outsourcing increases 
military effectiveness.  This thesis investigates whether PMSC activities in Iraq 
have delivered such monetary savings and operational enhancements.  Whether 
wartime contracting impacts waste, fraud, and corruption in the conflict and post 
conflict environment, particularly in the case of OIF, is also analyzed. 
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Chapter 1  
 
The Private Military Industry and US Outsourcing During 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 
 
 
 
This thesis analyzes state utilization of private military and security 
companies (PMSC), using United States Government (USG) outsourcing during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as a case study to investigate how PMSCs 
influence interstate conflicts.  Some of the stated benefits of hiring PMSCs are 
economic, as cost savings and efficiencies are a primary justification for 
outsourcing, yet the high monetary costs of the war indicate that the effectiveness 
of wartime spending deserves further scrutiny.  Government sources suggest 
outsourcing to these companies increases military effectiveness.  This thesis 
investigates whether PMSC activities in Iraq have delivered such increases and 
efficiencies.  Whether wartime contracting contributes to waste, fraud, and 
corruption in the conflict and post conflict environment, particularly in the case 
of OIF, is also analyzed. 
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 The military is generally perceived as providing a public good: national 
security.  This is one of the primary duties of the state.1  Unlike other government 
provided services that have oscillated between public and private provision due to 
“issues of cost, quality, or changing conceptions of governmental duties,”2 
military service provision has been an uncontested public good since the nation 
state system solidified.3  Although military outsourcing is not new, as contractors 
have been utilized by state militaries to some extent for centuries, essentially 
since the nation state system began, the degree to which wartime services have 
been contracted out and the scope of the services performed by private sector 
personnel over the past 20 years is certainly unprecedented.  This trend is not 
limited to the US.  State military outsourcing is a global phenomenon.4   
 The tremendous growth of the private military industry (PMI) during the 
past 20 years is often associated with the end of the Cold War.5  Political 
perceptions of potential military threats declined in the wake of the Cold War, 
leading many states to reduce their active military personnel.  Thus, a surplus of 
military labor moved into the private sector.  Some of these individuals chose to 
                                                   
1 See the Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section XIII 
2 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors - The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry 
(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2008), 7. 
3 Military goods, on the other hand, have been privately produced for states since at least 
the nineteenth century.   
Ibid., 6–7, 274. 
4 Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The rise of private 
military companies (New York: Routledge, 2006), 101; Armin Krishnan, War as 
Business: technological change and military service contracting (VT: Ashgate, 2008), 1; 
Singer, Corporate Warriors, 8. 
5 Robert Mandel, “The Privatization of Security,” Armed Forces & Society 28, no. 1 
(2001): 131; Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, “Subcontracting Sovereignty: Commodification 
of Military Force and Fragmentation of State Authority,” Brown Journal of World 
Affairs XIII, no. I (Fall/Winter 2006): 148; Peter Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise 
of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security,” 
International Security 26, no. 3 (2002 2001): 188. 
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capitalize on their unique set of military skills, providing their services for private 
profit and shifting the relationship between public and private service.6 
Economic considerations are not the only or even the primary concern 
during war.  The primary concern during war, at least for the state, is winning it, 
even if what constitutes a victory in many contemporary wars may be hard to 
define.  Nevertheless, economic processes are embedded in war and are 
considerable factors in determining winners and losers.  Thus, the economic 
aspects of war must be considered alongside the political aspects.  Consequently, 
the costs and benefits of utilizing PMSCs during war, as well as the ways in which 
their significant presence alters the dynamics of war and post-conflict 
environments, are emerging areas of study.  PMSCs are significant actors in Iraq 
and have been since OIF began.  Through government contracts for wartime 
support services, PMSCs are economic beneficiaries of war and thus have an 
investment in it.  That investment may compel companies to act in their best 
financial interests, which may not coincide with the political and diplomatic goals 
and interests of the state that hired them. 
 Although some incidences of contractor misconduct in Iraq have been 
highly publicized, most people likely remain unaware of the extent to which the 
US has relied on contractors in Iraq.  Contractors outnumber troops in Iraq and 
probably have for most of the war’s duration,7 which may seem counterintuitive 
since the US is widely considered the world’s largest military power.  The 2009 
                                                   
6 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 53. 
7 Attempts to collect comprehensive data on the numbers of contractor personnel in Iraq 
were reportedly not initiated until 2007.   
Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, CBO 
Paper (Washington DC: The Congress of the United States, 2008), 10. 
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US defense budget totaled $693 billion (see figure 1).8  To put this amount in 
perspective, US defense expenditures accounted for 46.5% of global military 
expenditures in 2009.9  The extent to which the US has outsourced support in 
Iraq seems contrary to the country’s defense capabilities, if measured by its 
defense expenditures.    
    
             Figure 1:  Global Defense Budgets:  Top Ten 
Global Defense Budgets: Top Ten 
 2008   
United States $693 
 
China $70 
United Kingdom $61 
Japan $50 
France $46 
Germany $44 
Saudi Arabia $41 
Russia $38 
India $34 
Brazil $28 
Data Source:  The Military Balance, 2011 
 
The rise of the PMI in recent decades has gone hand in hand with the 
intensification of government outsourcing initiatives.  These efforts have been 
made to streamline government operations.10  Subsequently, the USG has 
                                                   
8 “Chapter Ten: Country comparisons – commitments, force levels and economics,” The 
Military Balance 111, no. 1 (February 2011): 469.   
This figure does not include the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
9 Anup Shah, “World Military Spending”, July 7, 2010. 
10 USG policies that encourage or outline activities suitable for private sector 
performance include the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular A-76, first 
issued in 1966 and subsequently amended multiple times, and the 1998 Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act.   
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outsourced a wide variety of defense services.  Examples of such services include 
depot maintenance, transportation, aircraft and weapons maintenance, satellite 
services, modeling and simulation, and information technology services.11  
Although outsourcing initiatives have been implemented purposively and 
typically for normal maintenance and operations services, outsourced services 
have become an increasingly sizable aspect of wartime operations as well.  
 
Research Questions and Methodology 
 In this thesis, OIF is used as a case study to analyze the impact of PMSCs 
on interstate conflicts.  The following questions are investigated in this analysis: 
1) How is outsourcing to PMSCs thought to increase cost savings?  To what 
extent have anticipated cost savings been realized in the case of OIF?  How 
are the savings for wartime service contracts determined? 
2) How is the use of PMSCs thought to increase military effectiveness?  Have 
these benefits been realized in the case of OIF? 
3) Has OIF outsourcing increased the availability or number of combat 
troops? 
4) Does outsourcing wartime support services to PMSCs increase or decrease 
the prevalence of corruption, fraud, and waste?  If so, how? 
5) What is the relationship between the utilization of PMSCs and the 
duration of conflict? 
                                                                                                                                                       
John R Luckey, Valerie Bailey Grasso, and Kate M Manuel, Inherently Governmental 
Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for 
Congress, CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 2010), 5–7. 
11 Krishnan, War as Business, 49–151. 
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 The method used to conduct this research is a review and analysis of 
primary and secondary materials.  Materials were identified by searching online 
databases, including academic databases such as Academic OneFile, Google 
Scholar, ProQuest Research Library, Sage Journals Online, and SpringerLink; 
and a variety of government websites, including those of the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (SIGIR), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the 
Department of Defense (DOD).  Keywords searched include private 
military/security companies/firms, outsourcing, military outsourcing, private 
military industry, corruption, post conflict, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
contingency contracts, defense contracts, contractors, corporations, business, 
war, and Iraq war/reconstruction.  These keywords were searched in a variety of 
combinations, depending upon the relevance of articles being returned in each 
database.   
 A wide variety of audiences may be interested in this research.  Academic 
disciplines that could be enriched by this research include political science, 
international and globalization studies, peace and conflict studies, business, 
history, and military and security studies.  Policy makers, the US DOD, and other 
government agencies would also find this analysis useful in order to better 
understand the implications of this industry on state military operations and 
government policies and activities.  Also interested may be the PMI itself.  US 
citizens and taxpayers fund outsourced military and security services; thus this 
analysis would be of interest to them as it increases transparency and elucidates 
USG OIF expenditures. 
13 
 
   
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 This research is limited by the publicly available data on contract spending 
and contractor personnel; aggregate data is not available on OIF contractor 
personnel prior to 2007, four years after the conflict began.  Data limitations 
restricted possibilities for analyzing trends in contractor personnel numbers or 
functions in depth, as the validity and reliability of the data is too uncertain to 
draw meaningful conclusions.  However, the available data does provide a 
reasonable depiction of general contracting trends, and at minimum, confirms 
the significance of the contractor presence.  The sources used in this research 
were limited to documents in English.  Documents in other languages, 
particularly Arabic, certainly could have contributed valuable information to this 
analysis. 
Comparisons between and within conflicts are interesting areas for future 
research.  A study comparing US and British outsourcing during OIF could 
illuminate differences in outsourcing approaches across countries within the 
same conflict.   A contrast of US outsourcing during OIF and US outsourcing 
during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) would be interesting since OIF and 
OEF have been largely concurrent conflicts.  These studies would contribute to 
identifying trends in government outsourcing during wartime.  Further analyses 
of the costs and benefits of outsourcing during conflict, financial and otherwise, 
as well as how to measure and determine these costs and benefits would 
significantly add to the current literature.  These analyses could contribute to 
understanding whether, to what extent, and in what situations wartime 
14 
 
   
outsourcing is financially or operationally preferable to performing services in-
house.  Further investigation into the interrelations between PMSCs and 
governments could shed light on the PMI’s power and political influence.  
Related research could analyze the extent to which specific wartime services have 
been outsourced in relation to the military’s remaining in-house capabilities. 
 
Overview of the Following Chapters 
 Chapter two introduces the PMI, USG outsourcing for conflict support 
services, the state of Iraq before and after the US-led invasion in 2003, and 
PMSCs in Iraq during OIF.  Chapter three analyzes the primary reason for 
outsourcing, cost savings.  OIF outsourcing is examined within the theoretical 
framework on outsourcing.  Cost comparisons are reviewed and analyzed.  
Chapter four outlines additional justifications for outsourcing, particularly as 
stated by the USG.  The stated benefits of outsourcing are analyzed with respect 
to outsourced operational support in Iraq to determine the extent to which these 
stated benefits have been realized.  Chapter five investigates waste, fraud, and 
corruption in OIF contracting.  The concluding chapter, chapter six, considers the 
relationship between business and war and how this affects conflict dynamics 
and duration and summarizes the research findings presented in this thesis. 
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Chapter 2   
 
The Private Military Industry – Definitions, Developments, 
and Debates 
 
 
 
 Academic, governmental, and popular sources use the terms private 
military and security companies (PMSC), private military companies (PMC), 
and private military firms (PMF) interchangeably to refer to companies offering 
the whole spectrum of wartime services, while the term private security 
companies/contractors (PSC) often refers specifically to armed security 
providers.12  USG publications typically use the term private security contractors 
(PSC) to differentiate between companies providing armed security services and 
companies providing other operational support, such as logistics or 
construction.13  Despite this conceptual differentiation in some cases, these terms 
are often used as blanket descriptors for any companies involved in the provision 
of services related to military and security operations.  For the purposes of this 
                                                   
12 See, for example, Deborah Avant, The market for force : the consequences of 
privatizing security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David Isenberg, 
Shadow force : private security contractors in Iraq (Westport  Conn.: Praeger Security 
International, 2009). 
13 Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support, 2. 
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analysis, which focuses on defense and military outsourcing more generally, the 
term private military and security companies (PMSC) will be employed, 
referring to the whole spectrum of contracted service providers, while the term 
private security companies (PSC) will designate armed security providers 
specifically. 
PMSCs offer a wide variety of products and services to governments, 
nongovernmental organizations, supranational and international institutions, 
individuals, and corporations – essentially anyone who can pay or anyone who 
can at least provide the promise of future payment.  The services PMSCs provide 
range from cooking meals to firing at the enemy.  Service sectors include direct 
combat operations, military training, security services, intelligence gathering and 
analysis, transportation services, construction and energy related services, and 
logistical support.14   
 The PMI is developing along a path similar to other industries, as 
companies consolidate, collaborate, and transnationalize to maximize their profit 
making potentials.  US based Armor Holdings exemplifies these trends, acquiring 
over twenty companies in the late 1990s and expanding its reach across the globe 
with operations in more than 50 countries.15  Recent industry research also 
supports these developments.  In conducting a survey of executive level 
professionals from US based PMSCs, surveyors Nicholas Dew and Bryan 
                                                   
14 Avant, The Market for Force, 123; Singer, “Ramifications for International Security,” 
186. 
15 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 83–85. 
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Hudgens discovered “more than a dozen”16 companies had been bought out by 
larger PMSCs.  This illustrates the industry’s dynamism, as companies rapidly 
adapt to changing market demands, strategically using acquisitions to increase 
the service varieties a company has to offer.17  
Dew and Hudgens surveyed PMI executives and used their response data 
to identify nine market sectors within the industry.18  These include logistics and 
transportation; intelligence services; base operations and facilities management; 
security; maintenance and repair; construction services; medical services; 
training, advising, and mentoring; legal services; explosive ordinance disposal 
and de-mining; and aviation related services.  Sixty-four percent of survey 
respondents claimed to offer services in four or more of these areas, and just 13% 
offered services in only one area.19  Maintenance and aviation service providers 
correlated with higher revenues.20  Most companies surveyed said they worked 
“mainly” for the US DOD, and many also reported working for the US State 
Department.21  Bigger companies were more likely to work for large organizations 
such as the US DOD or NATO, and larger companies were also more likely to 
provide services outside of the US.  OIF contractors with the largest contracts, 
some worth billions of dollars, are companies that offer a multitude of services 
with multinational operations.   
                                                   
16 Kenneth H Curtis, Paul J Marko, and John J Parma, Understanding Market Segments 
and Competition in the Private Military Industry, MBA Professional Report (Monterey: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 28. 
17 Ibid., 28–30. 
18 Ibid., 64. 
19 Ibid., 41. 
20 Ibid., 23–25. 
21 Ibid., 34. 
18 
 
   
Deborah Avant examines the global market for defense services and how 
this market affects the distribution of power among states and non-state actors.  
Avant argues that security privatization “has created a global market for force 
that is shifting power within states, between states, and between states and non-
state actors.”22  A debate exists as to whether PMSCs constitute a threat to state 
sovereignty.  Those who argue PMSCs threaten state sovereignty contend these 
companies challenge the state’s monopoly on violence, which is a fundamental 
justification for the state’s existence.23  PMSCs, when utilized by states, can 
empower some states while disempowering others.  Additionally, the ability of 
non-state actors, whether groups or individuals, to buy services PMSCs provide 
can potentially challenge the state.   
Christopher Kinsey argues that PMSCs are “a new type of security actor on 
the international stage.”24  He cites South African based Executive Outcomes’ 
(EO) 1993 contract with Angola as a watershed in the industry’s trajectory.  EO’s 
operations in Angola served as an example of a private business successfully 
carrying out military services, illustrating a potential foreign policy tool on which 
other states would later draw.  PMSCs allow governments to exert influence while 
maintaining political and potentially economic distance.25  EO sold combat 
services to the Angolan government in the 1990s.  EO helped Angolan military 
forces contain powerful rebel groups.  United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces 
had been in Angola for several years before the Angolan government signed a 
                                                   
22 Avant, The market for force, 121. 
23 Maogoto, “Subcontracting Sovereignty,” 71; Virginia Newell and Benedict Sheehy, 
“Corporate Militaries and States: Actors, Interactions, and Reactions,” Texas 
International Law Journal 41, no. 1 (2006): 67-101. 
24 Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security, 4. 
25 Ibid., 62–63. 
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contract with EO, but UN efforts to contain UNITA (National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola) rebels had been largely ineffective.  UN peacekeeping 
operations under the UN Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM I and 
UNAVEM II) cost about $200 million, whereas the Angolan government paid EO 
roughly $60 million,26 although it is speculated that EO received additional 
payment in the form of natural resource concessions.27   
EO’s successes and the UN’s relative failures are possibly due not to EO’s 
superior capabilities, but to limitations put on UN forces.  UN peacekeeping 
forces are frequently criticized as inadequate in scenarios that require “peace-
enforcing, or combat”28 troops.  Critics argue UN operations are 
counterproductive when the presence of UN peacekeeping forces that refuse to 
engage in combat operations allows those engaged in conflict the opportunity to 
recuperate, rearm, and prepare for future operations, essentially prolonging 
conflicts that in the absence of UN peacekeepers would sooner end with a 
decisive victor and an eliminated opposition.29  
 
PMSCs Influencing Governments 
Alongside the industry’s growing economic power are concerns about its 
growing political influence.  PSMCs are increasingly able to influence government 
                                                   
26 Carlos Ortiz, Private Armed Security and Global Security (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 
2010), 82. 
27 Herbert M Howe, “Private security forces and African stability: the case of Executive 
Outcomes,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 2 (1998): 318. 
28 Ibid., 309. 
29 Edward N Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (August 1999): 47–
48. 
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policies.30  The PMI’s power and abilities to influence the political environment in 
ways that conform to PMSCs’ monetary interests increases as governments rely 
more on PMSC provided services.31  This influence is evident in the case of 
Military Professional Resources Incorporated’s (MPRI) contract with the 
Equatorial Guinean government, in which MPRI was to provide training and 
consulting services to the country’s military.  MPRI is a leading US based PMSC 
that provides military consulting and training services all over the world.  The 
company is staffed with former high-ranking US military officials who enjoy close 
ties with their former comrades.32  The US State Department initially rejected the 
proposed contract due to Equatorial Guinea’s repressive regime and its 
reputation of human rights violations.33  Further empowering such a regime was 
not necessarily in the USG’s interests.   However, after an intense two year 
lobbying campaign waged by MPRI, the USG eventually approved MPRI’s 
contract with Equatorial Guinea.34   
 
Governments Misusing PMSCs 
 Conversely, another heated debate surrounds not PMSC exploitation of 
government but government exploitation of PMSCs.  State utilization of PMSCs is 
often seen as a way to pursue unpopular objectives.35  By using private 
                                                   
30 Avant, The Market for Force, 128. 
31 Maogoto, “Subcontracting Sovereignty,” 149. 
32 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 120–121. 
33 American companies providing defense services outside the US are required to obtain 
authorization from the State Department through the Office of Defense Trade Controls 
(ODTC).  
34 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 128. 
35 Michael A Cohen and Maria Figueroa Kupcu, “Privatizing Foreign Policy,” World 
Policy Journal (Fall 2005): 42; Maogoto, “Subcontracting Sovereignty,” 151. 
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contractors rather than military personnel, politicians dramatically lower the 
political costs of conflict.36  Avant contends that under the current legal 
framework, at least in the US, PMSCs operate in an environment of low 
transparency and are further away from legislative oversight than the actual 
military, meaning they are also further away from democratic control.37  Current 
USG regulations allow the executive branch to bypass legislative controls.38  
American companies providing defense services to foreign entities must get prior 
approval from the State Department.  The State Department has to notify 
congress of contract authorizations only when they exceed $50 million.39  
Meanwhile, PMSCs also provide governments with plausible deniability; when 
problems come up and mistakes are made, governments can deny any knowledge 
of or involvement in the situation.40 
 For example, congressional limitations imposed on US military activities 
in support of the Columbian military under the US’s Plan Columbia program 
have been sidestepped by way of PMSCs.41  In an incident where Dyncorp 
employees rescued Columbian military personnel, the equipment used to 
perform the rescue and the actions taken against rebels in the process indicated 
that Dyncorp’s activities in the country went well beyond providing low-level 
                                                   
36 Avant, The Market for Force, 126. 
37 Ibid., 128. 
38 Maogoto, “Subcontracting Sovereignty,” 149; Singer, “Ramifications for International 
Security,” 217. 
39 In these cases, the State Department is not requesting congressional authorization or 
approval.  Colonel Bruce D Grant, U.S. Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military 
Consultants as a Tool of Foreign Policy, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: 
U.S. Army War College: United States Army, 1998), 11–13. 
40 Singer, “Ramifications for International Security,” 218. 
41 The US’s Plan Columbia program aims to help quell drug production and enhance 
state control. 
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support.  The company appeared to be performing functions US military 
personnel could not because of congressional prohibitions.42 
 
PMSCs and Military Professionalism 
 As the PMI grows, so does the demand for well-trained individuals.  This 
demand, alongside the higher pay and greater flexibility offered by the private 
sector, threatens governments’ abilities to retain their most valuable military 
personnel.  PMSCs compete directly with governments for personnel.43  Avant 
explains that although private security personnel may currently reflect national 
military standards of professionalism, this may be a temporary situation that 
exists at the present point of the industry’s growth and development.  As PMSCs 
fulfill tasks for governments with their former military personnel, these 
standards of professionalism are consistent between the private and public 
realms.  The private sector is fulfilling a formerly public sector task with formerly 
public sector personnel.  In time, however, if the private sector takes over the 
fulfillment of the aforementioned task, the military no longer performs that task 
and thus the probability that PMSC personnel carrying out the task are former 
military professionals diminishes.44 
 
                                                   
42 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 206–209. 
43 Cohen and Kupcu, “Privatizing Foreign Policy,” 42; Maogoto, “Subcontracting 
Sovereignty,” 157; Singer, “Ramifications for International Security,” 199. 
44 Avant, The Market for Force, 63. 
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US Government Contracting for Wartime Support – A Brief Historical 
Overview 
 The USG has utilized contractors during contingency operations to varying 
degrees throughout its history, depending on conflict circumstances, government 
policies, and military capabilities.  During the Revolutionary War, the US military 
began contracting out some logistical support services, copying this well 
instituted European practice, to improve basic provisioning and has continued to 
utilize contractors during conflict to some extent ever since.45  John Campbell 
contends the extent to which the military has outsourced wartime support follows 
a clear pattern:  the military increasingly relies on contracted services, contractor 
support becomes problematic and is followed by a decreasing reliance on 
contracted support; the reasons the military minimized contracted support are 
forgotten, and the cycle begins again.46 
According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “contractors typically 
provide services judged too menial or too specialized for government 
personnel.”47  Unfortunately, the CBO admits, “historical data on numbers of 
contractor personnel in-theater” is “sparse and inexact.”48  Despite this lack of 
concrete data, that contractors have become a larger part of US wartime 
operations now more than ever before is widely recognized.  The CBO attributes 
                                                   
45 Carey Luse et al., An Evaluation of Contingency Contracting: Past, Present, and 
Future, MBA Professional Report (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 6–7. 
46 John C Campbell, “Outsourcing and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): 
Contractors on the Battlefield” (School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2005), 67–69. 
47 Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support, 12. 
48 Ibid. 
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the increased extent to which the US has relied on contracted support during OIF 
as the product of three factors: 
1. The post Cold War military drawdown 
2. The emergence of a general government wide strategy to outsource 
3. A lack of the military personnel necessary to maintain a large-scale 
occupation over several years49  
 
Contingency Contracts 
 As the USG buys goods and services from private companies, the terms of 
which are stipulated in a contract, such providers are referred to simply as 
contractors.  Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) govern the contracting 
process.  Within the FAR, State Department contracts are administered according 
to Department of State Acquisition Regulations (DOSAR).  DOD contracts fall 
under Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFAR), and within the DFAR 
are special stipulations for contingency contracting.  Contracts for contingency 
operations such as OIF are subject to different, less restrictive rules, than 
contracts made under normal conditions.  Contingency regulations are less 
stringent than regular acquisition regulations to enable faster contracting 
processes and flexibility in the contingency environment.   
 Different government agencies and departments contract for contingency 
support services.  Each agency does so under its own specific guidelines and 
procedures.  When the contracting officer of an agency or department enters into 
                                                   
49 Ibid.   
This troop shortage seems to be more related to inadequacies in the military’s force 
structure rather than the result of a decline in overall personnel after the Cold War. 
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a contract, the contracting officer is responsible for oversight of that contract.  
Sometimes the contracting officer is not located where the contracted services are 
performed.  For DOD administered contracts, contracting officers may delegate 
oversight responsibilities directly or through the Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA).  Oversight responsibilities are typically delegated to someone 
already onsite who can conduct evaluations for the contracting officer, as the 
officer retains ultimate responsibility for the contract.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
50 Government Accountability Office, Military Operations - High-Level DOD Action 
Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of 
Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, Report to Congressional Committees 
(Washington DC: United States Government, 2006), 8–9. 
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Iraq – A Brief Historical Overview       
 
        
        Figure 2:  Map of Iraq 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  United Nations, “UN Iraq Map”, January 2004. 
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A 1920 British mandate established the modern state of Iraq (see figure 2) 
by consolidating three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire.  Iraq formally 
became an independent state in 1932.  The British installed a Sunni Muslim ruler, 
Amir Faysal, to run the newly established state despite Shia Muslims constituting 
the majority of the population.  Sunnis would continue to dominate the Iraqi 
political structure throughout the twentieth century.51   
Iraq’s population is approximately 97% Muslim, of which roughly 40% 
Sunni and 60% Shia, and three percent Christian.52  Most Iraqis are ethnically 
Arab, however, Iraq is also home to a significant Kurdish minority.  Kurds, who 
are mostly Sunni Muslims, make up roughly 20-25% of Iraq’s population and 
reside primarily in the north (see figure 3).  The Kurds are culturally and 
linguistically distinct and have actively sought Kurdish autonomy from the 
centralized Iraqi government essentially ever since Iraq’s central government was 
strong enough to exert its influence across the state.  Kurdish separatist aims 
resulted in an armed conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government from 
1961-1963.53   In addition to ethnic and religious variations in Iraqi society, tribal 
affiliations are another important aspect of the country’s demographics.  Iraq’s 
tribal structure was an important source of authority prior to and during 
Ottoman rule and has remained an influential element within Iraq’s sociopolitical 
situation ever since.54   
 
                                                   
51 William L Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, Third Edition. (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2004), 207–209. 
52 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Central Intelligence Agency The World 
Factbook: Iraq,” Central Intelligence Agency The World Factbook, April 12, 2011.  
53 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 329–330. 
54 Ibid., 205. 
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A 1968 coup brought the secular, albeit Sunni dominated, Iraqi Baath 
Party to power.  The 1970s was a prosperous decade for Iraq.  Living standards 
rose for most Iraqis, in large part due to rapidly increasing oil revenues.  Saddam 
Hussein officially assumed the presidency of Iraq in 1979 under the Baath Party, 
and in 1980 Iraq invaded Iran, waging a war that would last eight long years and 
essentially end in a stalemate.  The 1980s saw a reversal of socioeconomic gains 
made in the previous decade as government spending was diverted to funding 
Iraq’s war against Iran; investments in national industries and infrastructure 
Source:  Chris Recknagel, “Iraq’s Kurds Lose Political Dominance In Kirkuk” (Radio Free Europe Radio 
Liberty, March 21, 2010). 
Figure 3:  Geographic Composition of Religious and Ethnic Populations in Iraq 
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were cut.  Iraq’s war against Iran would cost Iraq more than its oil revenues 
totaled during those eight years of conflict.55 
 Hussein then led the country into another unsuccessful war, this time 
against Kuwait, in 1990.  The invasion was considered an attempt to augment 
state revenues and absolve Iraq’s outstanding debts owed to Kuwait.  Iraq 
claimed its revenues suffered because Kuwait drove down oil prices by violating 
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) production quotas.56  
The United Nations Security Council subsequently passed Resolution 661, 
imposing sanctions that would devastate the Iraqi people.  Abbas Alnasrawi 
summarizes the 1990 sanctions, which involved 
 a ban on all imports and was enforced by a naval and air blockade, 
an oil embargo, a freezing of Iraqi government financial assets 
abroad, an arms embargo, suspension of international flights, and a 
prohibition on financial transactions with Iraq.57   
UN mandated sanctions further degraded already neglected and war torn 
economic and social conditions in Iraq long after the conflict ended. 
The war officially ended in 1991 after the US led a multinational effort to 
oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  William Cleveland describes the attack on Iraq as 
“the most intensive air bombardment in military history”58 which “destroyed or 
disabled virtually the entire civilian infrastructure.”59  Following Iraq’s defeat, 
popular anti regime uprisings by southern Shias and northern Kurds broke out 
                                                   
55 Abbas Alnasrawi, “Oil, Sanctions, Debt and the Future,” Arab Studies Quarterly 4, no. 
23 (2001): 4–5. 
56 Ibid., 6–7; Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 479. 
57 Alnasrawi, “Oil, Sanctions, Debt and the Future,” 7. 
58 Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 484. 
59 Ibid., 489. 
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almost simultaneously.  The regime crushed the opposition and the US led an 
imposition of no fly zones over these northern and southern parts of the country 
to prevent further government led punishment and retribution. 
Resolution 687 outlined the terms of the ceasefire.  The UN determined 
Iraq was not in compliance with the resolution and almost all of the previously 
enacted sanctions were not lifted when the war ended.60  By 1991, UN reports 
were already describing the living situations of normal Iraqis as nearing the point 
of a humanitarian crisis.  It was not until five years later, despite failed attempts 
to negotiate with the regime, that the UN would partially lift the oil embargo 
through the ‘Oil for Food’ program, allowing Iraq to import much needed, 
although still woefully inadequate, food and supplies in exchange for oil export 
revenues.61         
      
Iraq After the 2003 US-led Invasion – Political Developments 
 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began on March 19, 2003 when the US led 
a multinational effort to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime from power.  Two 
months earlier, on January 20, 2003, the Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) was established to oversee and manage US efforts 
in Iraq once the US effectively took over responsibility for administering the 
state.62  Prewar planning at the highest levels of authority reportedly anticipated 
                                                   
60 Ibid., 485–487. 
61 Alnasrawi, “Oil, Sanctions, Debt and the Future,” 9–10. 
62 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons - The Iraq 
Reconstruction Experience (Washington DC: Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction, 2009), 33–34.   
ORHA was created by presidential decree through National Security Presidential 
Directive (NSPD 24), which established the office under the DOD’s responsibility. 
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quickly handing over governmental power and reconstruction responsibilities to 
an interim Iraqi government.63  Officials at the highest levels of the decision 
making process, for example President George W. Bush, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, refused to 
entertain the possibility that the post invasion transfer of power and 
responsibility to Iraqis would not be as simple as they imagined, despite the fact 
that people from the tops of various USG departments voiced these concerns.64   
Former Army Lieutenant General, Jay Garner, was solicited to head the 
newly created ORHA.  As Garner attempted to secure funds needed for initial 
post invasion reconstruction efforts, amounts based on even minimal projections 
were not immediately forthcoming.  In a conversation Garner had with Rumsfeld, 
Rumsfeld told Garner, “’if you think we’re going to spend a billion dollars of our 
money over there, you are sadly mistaken.’”65  It was assumed Iraq’s oil revenues 
would finance post war operations and reconstruction. 
 Garner immediately began organizing an interim Iraqi government for 
ORHA to transfer authority until President Bush terminated this initiative and 
replaced ORHA with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by Paul 
Bremer.  On July 13, 2003 Bremer established “a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory 
body: the 25-member ‘Iraqi Governing Council’ (IGC).”66  The US returned 
sovereignty to a temporary Iraqi government on June 28, 2004, “officially” 
ending the US occupation of Iraq.  As of this transition, the Iraq Reconstruction 
                                                   
63 Ibid., 62. 
64 Ibid., 40–42. 
65 Ibid., 42. 
66 Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, CRS Report for 
Congress (Congressional Research Service, 2009), 9. 
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and Management Office (IRMO), which falls under US State Department 
authority, took over “reconstruction management and advising of Iraq’s 
ministries.”67  Iraqis elected a temporary assembly in January of 2005, although 
Sunni Arabs boycotted this election.  An Iraqi state constitution was drafted and 
approved under this government.  In December 2005 elections were held for a 
full term government.  Provincial elections were held in January of 2009.  
 
Iraq After the 2003 US-led Invasion – Socioeconomic Conditions 
 Restoring essential services to the Iraqi people after the invasion was, and 
continues to be, a difficult and slow process.  Despite the fact that major 
infrastructure projects were planned and paid for, basic provisions such as access 
to clean water and electricity were slow to reach people on a regular basis. 
Electricity did not reach average pre war production levels until late 2007.  In 
2008, over 40% of the population did not have regular access to clean water.68  In 
2009, oil production was still lower than pre-war capacity levels.69  
 Iraq remains highly dependent on the exportation of oil.  Oil exports 
account for at least 85% of government revenues.70  Although Iraq’s oil reserves 
are plentiful, second only to Saudi Arabia, Iraq has a large and growing 
population that oil revenue alone cannot sustain.  Economic diversification is 
essential for sustainable and equitable economic gains.  Forty-three percent of 
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The IRMO was renamed the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) in April 2007.   
68 Curt Tarnoff, Iraq: Reconstruction Assisstance, CRS Report for Congress 
(Congressional Research Service, 2009), 11. 
69 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” U.S. Energy 
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employed Iraqis work in the public sector and almost 30% of 15-29 year old men 
are unemployed.71  Iraq ranks 166th out of 183 countries on The World Bank and 
International Financial Corporation’s Ease of Doing Business index.72  Insecurity, 
an unfriendly regulatory environment, and potential political instability have 
thwarted not only economic diversification, but also the development of Iraq’s oil 
industry. 
 
Private Military and Security Companies in Iraq 
 There have been disagreements between and within USG departments 
regarding how to track federal contractors, what information to collect, whether 
such information should be collected to begin with, and what purpose it would 
serve years before contractors began supplementing, replacing, and even 
outnumbering US soldiers during OIF.  A 1991 Department of Defense Inspector 
General (DOD-IG) audit recommended the DOD collect and centralize 
information on contracts and contractor personnel related to “emergency-
essential services” for management, oversight, and planning purposes to ensure 
contractors’ continued performance during contingencies.73  The Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel responded “that the 
ability to carry out our mission is more important than the number of 
                                                   
71 Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit and United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003--2008, 
January 2009. 
72 International Financial Corporation and The World Bank, “Ranking of Economies - 
Doing Business - World Bank Group”, 2011. 
73 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Civilian Contractor Overseas 
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contracts,”74 despite the recognized utility of such data from within the 
department, as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics 
requested data on contracts and contractor personnel supporting Operation 
Desert Shield shortly before the DOD-IG assessment.75 
 As OIF contractors received greater publicity, congressional 
representatives began asking questions about who they were and what they were 
doing.  Basic data on contracts and contractors was aggregately unavailable.  An 
electronic database was established for DOD, State Department, and United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) OIF contracts and 
contractor information to address this absence of data.76  Meanwhile, 
departmental efforts to track and count contractors in Iraq commenced.   
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the DOD began 
collecting data on contractors in late 2007.  Thereafter, the DOD submitted 
quarterly contractor census reports to the US Congress, providing data on DOD 
contractor personnel in Iraq (see figure 4).77  DOD census data derives from 
company submitted counts reported to regional DOD authorities throughout 
Iraq.78  USAID and the State Department do not produce or submit such 
publically available quarterly reports; consequently, USAID and State 
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75 Ibid., 12. 
76 DFARS 252.225-7040 March 2007.  Data are to be entered into the Synchronized 
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Department contractor personnel data is quite limited (see figure 5).  
Nevertheless, the available data illustrate that reported numbers of contractor 
personnel in Iraq have fluctuated alongside US soldiers between 2007 and 2010, 
until 2011 when contractor personnel reportedly outnumber soldiers by a wider 
margin as the US military presence in Iraq draws down. 
In October of 2010, over seven years after the war began, a Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) investigation into DOD, State Department, and 
USAID contractor data warned that “caution should be exercised when using the 
agency-provided data on contractor and assistance personnel to draw conclusions 
about either the actual number in Iraq…for any given time period or trends over 
time.”79  Nevertheless, various reports have produced estimates on contractor 
personnel in Iraq, primarily relying on DOD, State Department, and USAID data 
to produce these estimates.  Reports repeatedly emphasize that contractor 
personnel estimates are lower than actual numbers due to acknowledged 
inadequacies, largely government agencies’ inabilities to collect comprehensive 
data and the limited data available on subcontractor personnel.80  Thus, the 
number of reported contractor personnel has been consistently close to the 
number of military personnel in Iraq, but actual numbers of contractor personnel 
at any point in time have likely been greater than illustrated in figures 4 and 5. 
 
 
                                                   
79 Government Accountability Office, Iraq and Afghanistan - DOD, State, and USAID 
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The Commission on Wartime Contracting divides contingency contracting 
into three categories:  reconstruction, logistics, and security.81  Security services 
are a relatively new area of wartime outsourcing, as the military has generally 
provided security during previous conflicts.  Security services can be divided into 
                                                   
81 Commission on Wartime Contracting, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, Interim Report to Congress (Washington DC: United States 
Government, 2009), 8. 
Source:  Adapted from Mosche Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, Department of Defense 
Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis, CRS Report for Congress 
(Congressional Research Service, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 4:  Department of Defense Contractor and Military Personnel Estimates: 
September 2007 - December 2010 
37 
 
   
three categories: personal security, convoy security, and static security.  Personal 
security refers to diplomatic and federal civilian personnel protection, convoy 
security refers to travelling motorcade protection, and static security refers to 
guarding facilities such as military bases and construction sites.82  Between 
March 2008 and December 2010, over 50% of DOD contractor personnel in Iraq 
were providing base support services (see figure 6).  During the same time period, 
construction contractor personnel decreased from 20% to almost zero, while 
security contractor personnel represented roughly 5% of DOD contractor 
personnel in March 2008, and almost 20% in December 2010 (see figure 6).83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
82 Ibid., 60–66. 
83 Schwartz and Swain, Department of Defense Contractors, 15–16. 
Figure 5:  DOD, USAID, and State Department Contractor Personnel:    
December 2007 - December 2010 
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         Figure 6:  DOD Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
         Source:  Adapted from Mosche Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, Department of Defense     
         Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis, CRS Report for Congress  
         (Congressional Research Service, 2011), 4. 
 
Most OIF contract expenditures derived from the DOD, the State 
Department, and USAID, although other departments contracted for services in 
significantly smaller amounts.  As illustrated by the CBO graph in figure 7, DOD 
spending on contracts has been significantly higher than that of the State 
Department or USAID. 
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        Source:  Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support  
           of U.S. Operations in Iraq, CBO Paper (Washington DC: United  
           States Government, 2008), 3. 
 
OIF support services were sometimes performed in countries nearby 
rather than in Iraq itself.  Thus, in addition to contracts designated as principally 
performed in Iraq, contracts principally performed in Kuwait, Turkey, Bahrain, 
   Figure 7:  Contract Spending 2003-2007 
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Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were often 
contracts for OIF support (see figure 7).  These countries are collectively referred 
to as the Iraq theater of operations.84  OIF support operations in Kuwait were 
much greater and more extensive than in the other countries in the Iraq theater 
of operations.  Kuwait has been a central transit point, as troops and supplies 
often go through Kuwait on their way to Iraq.  As illustrated in figure 8, in some 
years the total number of contracts performed in Kuwait actually outnumbered 
contracts performed in Iraq. 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
                                                   
84 Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support, 3. 
Figure 8:  Contracts Principally Performed in Iraq and Kuwait:  2003-2010 
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 Both the CRS and CBO estimate contracted support accounts for at least 
20% of OIF spending.85  According to the Federal Procurement Data System–
Next Generation (FPDS-NG), contracts principally performed in Iraq and Kuwait 
from 2003-2010 totaled $122 billion (see figure 8).86  Contracts principally 
                                                   
85 Ibid., 2–3; Schwartz and Swain, Department of Defense Contractors, 17.   
The CBO estimate refers to overall USG OIF spending, whereas the CRS estimate refers 
specifically to DOD spending. 
86 Data accessed in July 2011.  FARs require USG departments to enter unclassified 
federal procurement data into the FPDS-NG.  FPDS-NG data is continually updated with 
past information, so different access dates may yield different results.  Contract data has 
been and remains unreliable and incomplete.  DOD data has been repeatedly cited as not 
encompassing all unclassified contracts and individual contract records as incomplete.  
Different sources of data on contractors and contracts often conflict.   
Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support, 5; Government Accountability 
Office, Iraq and Afghanistan - DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges, 20.  
Figure 9:  Contract Spending by Country of Performance 2003-2010 
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performed throughout the Iraq theater of operations between 2003 and 2010 
totaled $147 billion (see figure 9).87 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
GAO, CBO, and other departmental cost estimates of OIF contracting lack desirable cost 
break downs, however, this data is presumably more accurate than FDSP-NG data 
because agencies acquire supplemental data directly from the DOD, State Department, 
and USAID, including data on classified contracting operations purposively omitted 
from the FDSP-NG database.  The CBO estimates $85 billion in contract spending from 
2003-2007 for services performed in the Iraq theater of operations.   
Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support, 2–3.   
According to the CRS, DOD contracted OIF support totaled nearly $113 billion between 
2005 and 2010.   
Schwartz and Swain, Department of Defense Contractors, 17.  
87 http://www.usaspending.gov.  Accessed July 2011. 
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Chapter 3   
 
US Outsourcing During Operation Iraqi Freedom:   
The Costs 
 
 
 As of mid-2007 Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown, & Root’s (KBR) 
OIF support contracts with the USG totaled roughly $20 billion.  Industry expert 
Peter Singer says that after converting the costs of previous wars into current 
dollars, “the U.S. government paid Halliburton about $7 billion more than it cost 
the United States to fight the American Revolution, the war of 1812, the Mexican-
American War, and the Spanish American War combined.”88  In relation to 
contemporary US engagements, KBR (as of mid-2007) had already made three 
times more than the 1991 Gulf War cost the United States in its totality.89 
The fact that more money has been paid to one company than has been 
spent on several previous wars combined does not in and of itself indicate 
whether the US is paying more for services provided by contractors instead of 
military personnel.  This chapter will analyze whether contracting for wartime 
services in Iraq has cost less than if government personnel provided such services.  
Essential elements of successful outsourcing identified in the literature include 
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competition and contract management.90  These areas are examined in the 
context of USG OIF outsourcing.  Few studies compare the costs of contractor 
and military provided services in Iraq.  Those that have been conducted illustrate 
the complexity involved in attempting to make such comparisons adequately and 
accurately. 
 
Why Outsource? 
Privatization, broadly defined, refers to “any policy directed at reducing 
governmental involvement in economic and social life.”91  The CRS outlines the 
following types of privatization: “divestiture/load-shedding, contracting for 
goods, contracting for services (outsourcing), vouchers, quasi-governmental 
entities (including government-owned-contractor-operated facilities (GOCO)), 
third-party financing, grants to private parties, prize competitions, and the use of 
volunteers.”92  In this context, outsourcing is a subdivision of privatization. 
Outsourcing occurs when businesses or governments hire outside service 
providers to perform functions formerly performed by in-house personnel.  Only 
the government privatizes, governments and businesses outsource.93  Beyond this 
basic definition, Paul Jensen and Robin Stonecash find that “recent work comes 
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92 Kevin R Kosar, Privatization and the Federal Government: An Introduction, CRS 
Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 2006), 12–13. 
93 Krishnan, War as Business, 40. 
45 
 
   
to the conclusion that no generalizable theory of outsourcing exists.”94  Decisions 
of what and how to outsource are not predetermined; specialized strategies must 
be devised and implemented for outsourcing efforts to be successful.95 
 Companies often outsource when doing so would presumably cost less 
than in-house performance.  However, no standard methods for empirically 
measuring the effects of outsourcing, financial or otherwise, exist.  Bin Jiang and 
Amer Qureshi review the research on outsourcing outcomes and find that most 
studies rely on perceptions and self-reports rather than concrete financial data 
analyses to assess the effectiveness of outsourcing initiatives.96  The financial 
impacts of outsourcing have not been assessed systematically or comprehensively. 
Government outsourcing is a tool used in pursuing a “better allocation of 
state resources.”97  Non-inherently governmental services can be contracted out 
so government personnel can focus on fulfilling essential functions.  For example, 
the Australian Industry Commission asserts outsourcing public sector IT services 
resulted in “improvements in quality of service delivery arising from greater 
specialization through the outsourcing of particular non-core activities and from 
the monitoring of service providers.”98  Outsourcing may be strategically pursued, 
but it may also stem from necessity when a government does not possess or 
cannot otherwise obtain the skills or abilities needed to perform certain functions.  
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The private sector is presumably more efficient than the public sector 
because private sector enterprises are motivated by profit.99  The private sector 
can provide goods and services of better quality, at lower costs, or in a speedier 
fashion because private sector actors strive for efficiency and innovation to 
maximize profits and undercut competitors.   However, businesses do not 
necessarily emphasize efficiency, nor do they necessarily deliver it.  This is not to 
say public sector efficiency rivals that of the private sector, rather, “many private 
sector enterprises are as inefficient as are their government counterparts.”100  
Jonas Prager suggests that with government functions, “the issue is not inherent 
inefficiency as much as a lack of political will”101 to prioritize and promote 
efficiency. 
 
Contemporary Military Outsourcing – The Strategy 
 As private sector outsourcing increased in popularity, the USG noticed and 
attempted to apply outsourcing techniques within its organization, the DOD 
included, in order to cut costs, streamline government operations, and minimize 
bureaucratic inefficiencies.  The DOD’s outsourcing initiative was termed a 
Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA); a military transformation through the 
adoption of successful business practices.102  Military support services have been 
outsourced purposively to lower costs, increase efficiency, and enhance 
capabilities.  
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As the DOD investigated outsourcing, the private sector promoted it.  
Throughout the 1990s and still today the industry association Business 
Executives for National Security (BENS) has advocated defense privatization and 
outsourcing.  The Defense Science Board (DSB) task force on outsourcing and 
privatization pronounced overstated savings estimates as it promoted DOD 
outsourcing in the mid-1990s.103  In one analysis, the DSB estimated a potential 
$6 billion in annual savings from outsourcing logistical support for DOD facilities 
located in the US.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Program Analysis and 
Evaluation department analyzed this estimate and concluded it was overstated by 
$4 billion.  In addition, the GAO contended the DSB estimate assumed an 
outsourcing environment of intense competition in areas where “competitive 
markets may not… exist.”104  
 
Competitive Contracting 
Studies show cost savings derive primarily from competition, rather than 
from outsourcing per se.105  This is because savings occur when private and public 
entities compete, while neither private nor public providers have been 
systematically associated with greater savings.106  Reflecting this assessment, a 
1996 DOD publication, Improving the Combat Edge through Outsourcing, 
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contends services should be outsourced “only when the private sector can 
improve performance or lower costs in the context of long term competition.”107  
The report emphasizes that competition amongst suppliers is the key to 
maximizing cost savings and promoting innovation.   
Despite the government’s apparent comprehension of competition’s 
criticality on paper, OIF outsourcing has illustrated the government’s failure to 
prioritize it in practice.  Preexisting departmental policies, as well as failures in 
implementing others, specific wartime directives, confidentiality requirements, 
and perceived emergencies limited and inhibited competitive contracting. 
 The USG limited its abilities to maximize quality and minimize costs when 
contracting for OIF support by restricting competition and precluding potential 
providers.  As stipulated by the Foreign Assistance Act, USAID contracts 
exclusively with American companies, the only exception being when American 
companies alone cannot competitively provide needed goods and services.  As 
USAID lawyer Marburg-Goodman explains, “this rule can result in inferior or 
more expensive goods or services being procured than would be the case if 
worldwide sources were solicited.”108 
 When the US Congress approved the $18.4 billion Iraq Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund 2 (IRRF2) in November 2003, it stipulated IRRF2 funded 
contracts be awarded through competitive procedures.  This provision was largely 
in response to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1 (IRRF1) spending.  Many 
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IRRF1 funded contracts were awarded without adequately competitive bidding 
processes.  Shortly thereafter, in December 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Paul Wolfowitz modified the congressionally mandated provision when he 
declared prime contracts would be awarded to companies based in coalition 
member states, Iraq, or the US, as necessitated by US security interests.109  
Nevertheless, companies based in other countries were completely eligible for 
subcontracts.110  This justification, which essentially banned companies from 
roughly 130 countries, made little sense in theory and contradicted its stated 
purpose in practice.  As has been widely reported, the USG has little effective 
knowledge or oversight of subcontractors.111  Thus, if such companies were 
potential security threats it would have made more sense to employ them under 
prime contracts so the USG would have greater visibility into their operations and 
activities.   
Urgency at times necessitates non-competitive contracting, particularly 
during a conflict’s inception.  Competitive practices and procedures should be 
transitioned in later to minimize costs, yet the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting says this transition was slow and inadequate throughout OIF.112  The 
US Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program III (LOGCAP III) contract 
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exemplifies the failure to replace expensive emergency contracts with more cost 
efficient contracts awarded through competitive procedures.  The army’s 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is designed to provide 
primarily base support services to troops during military mobilizations.113  
Originally intended to support military forces during the onset of contingency 
operations, services have been provided under the LOGCAP III contract, the 
largest OIF contract, throughout OIF’s duration.  
 
Contract Management 
Outsourcing relinquishes control to the service provider.  Effective 
contract management minimizes this loss of control.  Contract monitoring 
requires resources and may be expensive, however, “efficient monitoring… pays 
for itself by preventing overcharges and poor quality performance in the first 
place, by recouping inappropriate outlays, and by disallowing payment for 
inadequate performance.”114  Monitoring refers to both technical and financial 
monitoring (see figure 10).  Assuring the quality of contracted goods and services 
is particularly crucial, “because of the contractors incentive to save money”115 and 
increase profits by delivering goods or services of lesser quality than contractually 
stipulated.  
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     Source:  Adapted from Government Accountability Office, Military Operations – High-Level     
       DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing problems with Management and Oversight of  
       Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, Report to Congressional Committees (Washington   
       DC: United States Government, 2006), 10. 
 
 
Inadequate and inefficient contract management plagued USG OIF 
outsourcing efforts.  Prager contends that contract management “is inefficient for 
the very same reasons” as “general cost-inefficient government production.”116  
When outsourcing for OIF support, as with government outsourcing in general, a 
primary question for analysis asks, “will contracting out prove even more costly 
                                                   
116 Prager, “Contracting Out Government Services,” 181. 
    Figure 10:  Elements of Department of Defense Contract Management 
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than inefficient government provision of specific services?”117  Personnel 
shortages, a poor institutional framework, poor interagency coordination, 
relevantly unskilled personnel, high turnover rates, security concerns, and 
widespread apathy towards contract management have significantly impeded the 
USG’s abilities to manage OIF contracts successfully. 
 
Personnel Shortages 
Personnel shortages pervaded DOD, State Department, and USAID 
administered contracts at all phases of the contracting process.118  These 
shortages created serious delays in the execution of reconstruction projects.  The 
government wanted projects to start right away; contracts were awarded, but task 
orders to perform specific services developed slowly.119  Contractors sent 
personnel to Iraq as contractually stipulated, however, many contracts did not 
outline the work to be performed with specificity and required government 
directives before commencement.  Contractors charged overhead fees for 
contractor personnel while waiting for these directives, which were delivered 
later than originally anticipated.120  
In addition to personnel shortages, government personnel were often 
assigned contractor performance monitoring in addition to their already full 
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workloads.  Those responsible for oversight were rarely qualified to oversee 
projects, oftentimes inexperienced and without knowledge of the project sector or 
relevant technical expertise.121  US Army Intelligence and Security Command 
officials reported that personnel overseeing translators in Iraq did not speak 
Arabic, and there were several reported incidences of inaccurate translations by 
contractors.122  Contract monitors must have relevant knowledge and expertise to 
properly evaluate contractor performance and ensure the quality of contractor 
provided services. 
The short-term deployments of government personnel responsible for 
writing, awarding, and overseeing contracts contributed to problems and delays 
on the ground.  Some deployments were as short as one or two months, while 
many lasted only six.123  By the time personnel would get situated and 
familiarized with operational procedures, the institutional situation, contractors, 
and contracts, it would be time for them to return to the US and their knowledge 
of the situation would be lost.  For example, a DCMA employee overseeing 
contractor provided services at 27 different locations in Iraq did not physically 
visit all 27 sites during his six-month deployment in Iraq.124  Contracting officers 
are the primary officials responsible for contract management and oversight on 
the ground.  According to Parsons Delaware Incorporated, the contracting officer 
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assigned to one of its OIF contracts changed 17 times in two years.125  Short-term 
deployments led to the loss of institutional knowledge and discontinuity in 
contract management and oversight in Iraq. 
High-level officials involved in OIF contracting were typically unconcerned 
with cost.  Illustrating this point, the Commission on Wartime Contracting 
pronounces: 
For many senior officials, contractors appear to be a “free” source of 
labor with no direct impact on their budgets.  Funded out of what 
they perceive to be unconstrained overseas contingency-operation 
budgets, many senior officials pay scant attention to articulating 
specific support requirements, negotiating contract terms, and 
managing contractor performance.126 
Although outsourcing has been deliberately pursued to lower costs, officials 
involved in OIF contracting often failed to prioritize essential outsourcing 
elements that ensure contracted services are obtained for the best value or lowest 
cost. 
 
Government Provision versus Contractor Provision:  The Costs 
Empirically assessing the effectiveness of outsourcing is difficult, as 
innumerable factors potentially affect costs.  Despite the challenges, it is 
imperative to analyze whether outsourcing proves cost efficient, as DOD 
outsourcing was initiated specifically to lower expenditures.  Necessary and 
appropriate cost data is often unavailable for public sector activities, further 
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problematizing before and after assessments of government outsourcing 
initiatives.  According to Jensen and Stonecash, most studies on government 
outsourcing conclude outsourcing yields cost savings.  However, actual savings 
from outsourcing the provision of public services to the private sector typically 
prove significantly less substantial than originally anticipated.127  
 DOD outsourcing initiatives, both proposed and implemented, involve 
costs the department has not acknowledged or included in its estimates.  These 
include “the costs to conduct the study, personnel transition costs, contract 
administration costs, and scope of work changes.”128  To date, the DOD has been 
unable to accurately document “actual program costs and program changes,”129 
essential elements in determining whether savings actually result.  Meanwhile, 
DOD “leadership continues to make budgetary decisions based on inaccurate and 
inflated cost savings estimates.”130  Reflecting this assessment, two of the only 
publically available government produced OIF outsourcing cost comparisons do 
not account for contract management costs. 
                                                                                                                                        
Security Services – The Congressional Budget Office’s Cost Comparison 
In 2008 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) compared the costs of PSC 
provided and military provided diplomatic security services to State Department 
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personnel in Iraq.  The CBO explains, “the Army’s goal is to have two units at 
home station (that is, in the rotation base) for each unit deployed overseas.  The 
time at home lets units recuperate from their deployment, reconstitute personnel 
and equipment, and train for their next deployment.”131   The CBO compared 
costs based on the army’s goal ratio (2 to 1) and the actual ratio (1.2 to 1) at the 
time of its assessment.  Outsourcing security services costs about $10 million 
more than providing security in-house when calculated under a rotation base 
ratio of 1.2 to 1.  Outsourcing security services costs about $10 million less than 
military provided security under the alternative scenario based on the army’s goal 
ratio.132 
The CBO’s comparison does not account for potential long-term savings in 
its analysis.  Its estimate does not include the long-term benefits soldiers receive, 
such as free or low cost healthcare provided by the Department of Veterans 
Affairs (DVA) after their service ends.  Also missing from the analysis are payroll 
savings that accrue after the war, as the contract can simply expire without 
renewal, whereas the increase in soldiers would result in greater expenses during 
peacetime since military personnel remain on the payroll when conflict ends.133   
On the other hand, there are also potential costs omitted from the 
comparison.  On the ground, military commanders do not have the authority to 
direct contractor activities except as specified in the contract, whereas 
commanders can redirect military and civilian personnel activities according to 
changing needs and conditions on the ground.  Thus, soldiers and DOD civilian 
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employees can be reemployed and put to more productive uses, whereas 
contractors may remain idle or unnecessarily engaged when conditions change 
and their contracted services are no longer needed.134 
The CBO’s assessment does not include transaction costs, which include 
costs associated with the bidding and award process, creating the contract, 
contract management and oversight, and reviewing and processing documents 
for payment.  Rather than reduce expenditures and improve efficiency, the CBO 
itself says using contractors to fulfill “functions for which there are extensive 
costs involved in setting up, monitoring, and enforcing contracts could make 
outsourcing a poor option,”135 increasing costs and decreasing efficiency.  Yet, the 
CBO fails to include any of these costs in its estimate, thus the extent of these 
relevant costs in this case is unknown. 
 
Security Services – The Government Accountability Office’s Cost Comparison 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) compared the costs of PSC 
provided and State Department provided security services under one contract 
and four task orders (see figure 11).  The GAO concluded contractors would cost 
less than State Department personnel under three of the four task orders for 
regional security services.  However, it would be summarily cheaper if the State 
Department provided regional security because the one scenario in which the 
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State Department costs less outweighs the cost differentials of the other three 
task orders combined by $53.7 million (see figure 11).136  
Estimated State Department expenses include the costs of maintaining a 
rotational structure wherein for every State Department employee in Iraq, 
another is stationed in the US.  The GAO does not include the costs of recruiting 
and training new personnel, which would be necessary if such a replacement 
were implemented at the time of the GAO’s comparison because the State 
Department did not employ enough people to fulfill those functions.137  However, 
personnel stationed in the US do not necessarily constitute added costs with no 
benefits.  While stationed in the US, such personnel fulfill other functions for the 
USG, functions that in their absence might be contracted out or fulfilled by other 
personnel.  Thus, although these expenses constitute higher costs in this scenario, 
they may correspond with lower costs in other areas of expenditures.  This is not 
addressed in the GAO’s report.  Nevertheless, maintaining the personnel 
necessary to sustain a deployment rotation involves costs contractors do not 
incur.  Additionally, the GAO does not include contract management costs in its 
comparison because the State Department could not provide the relevant cost 
estimations.138 
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Figure 11:  GAO Cost Comparison 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Government Accountability Office, Warfighter Support: A Cost 
Comparison of Using State Department Employees versus Contractors for Security Services in 
Iraq (Washington DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2010), 6. 
 
The GAO estimates State Department provided security services would 
cost $785 million more than outsourcing these services to PSCs under the 
Baghdad Embassy Static Security Contract.139  The GAO’s comparison clearly 
delineates cost variations along labor force lines.  When contractor personnel 
largely consist of third country and host country nationals, as is the case for the 
Baghdad Embassy Static Security Contract, in which 89% of personnel are not US 
citizens, savings are substantially greater than the scenarios in which contractor 
personnel are predominately US citizens.  The one task order the GAO estimates 
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in-house provision would cost less than outsourcing is the only task order in 
which 100% of PSC personnel are US citizens (see figures 11 and 12).140  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Government Accountability Office, Warfighter Support: A Cost 
Comparison of Using State Department Employees versus Contractors for Security Services in 
Iraq (Washington DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2010), 6. 
  *Note: 45 contractor personnel are unaccounted for in the Baghdad Embassy Static Security nationality estimates. 
 
Labor – Compensation Savings 
 The flexibility involved in outsourcing contributes to cost savings, as it is 
expensive to train, maintain, and mobilize large numbers of military personnel 
that are unnecessary during times of relative peace.  Many PMSC personnel are 
former military servicemen.  Critics argue this is an abuse of taxpayer money 
since taxpayers fund the military training PMSCs later capitalize on.  Even so, the 
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Figure 12:  GAO Cost Comparison:  Contractor Labor Force by Nationality  
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government still incurs these training costs regardless of whether PMSCs employ 
former military service personnel.  Neil Harris suggests PMSCs also incur 
training costs since they pay higher compensation to retain highly trained 
individuals.141  When contracted by the government, however, this higher 
compensation would be reflected in the company’s bid and thus still paid by the 
government. 
 Contractors are temporary whereas military personnel remain in uniform 
and on the payroll when contingencies end.  The potential savings from the 
presumed post contingency payroll of active duty military personnel are real, 
however actual savings will likely amount to much less than seems to be the 
assumption.  The military can decrease personnel by recruiting less and 
diminishing the extra incentives it currently offers such as enlistment and 
reenlistment bonuses.  Given that two simultaneous wars have stretched out over 
almost a decade, at this rate the military could have gained new personnel who 
signed up, served their initial enlistment time, and got out two times over without 
actually increasing overall personnel.   
 Most cost savings deriving from wartime outsourcing will likely accrue 
from the costs of long-term veterans’ benefits that contractors do not receive, 
such as the GI Bill, healthcare, disability payments, and retirement.142  Thus, 
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most of the potential savings from wartime outsourcing are not realized until 
many years after conflict ends.   
Veterans of overseas contingency operations are eligible to receive free 
medical care for potentially service-related conditions for five years after serving 
in the military.  After these first five years, veterans receive free or subsidized 
DVA provided medical services, depending upon their designated priority level, 
income, and disability status.  According to a CBO estimate of DVA healthcare 
expenditures through 2020, annual healthcare costs for overseas contingency 
operations veterans will constitute on average 7-8% of the DVA’s total costs for all 
enrolled veterans receiving DVA medical treatment.143   
The CBO’s estimate has been criticized for ignoring the longer term costs 
associated with OIF veterans’ healthcare, which will be more substantial than 
those incurred through 2020.  Medical costs for war veterans do not reach their 
peak until 30 to 40 years after conflict ends, meaning OIF veterans’ medical costs 
will not reach their peak until about 2050.  Linda Bilmes, a researcher who has 
done extensive work on the actual and long-term costs of OIF alongside former 
World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz, estimates the long-term costs for 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) veterans’ benefits could exceed $600 billion - 
$1 trillion.144  As of 2011, roughly 50% of GWOT veterans qualify for government 
provided disability compensation and subsidized medical care for the rest of their 
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lives.  GWOT veterans are also utilizing their DVA benefits at a higher rate than 
previous war veterans.145  Assessing both the short and long-term costs of 
outsourcing is critical to determining its effectiveness. 
Through outsourcing, it appears the USG will avoid some of the long-term 
medical costs associated with conflict.  In the absence of contractors, military or 
government civilian personnel would presumably perform most functions that 
have been outsourced.  However, as Hammes notes, “contractors may claim their 
insurance covers those costs, the government, in fact, paid for that insurance 
through the contract, and if the coverage proves insufficient, the government may 
well end up paying for the continued care through various governmental medical 
programs.”146  Given that the majority of contractor personnel operating in Iraq 
are not US citizens, such contractor medical expenditures will not be borne by the 
USG to the extent that would be paid to former American military or government 
civilian personnel.  Depending on contractor nationality, other countries may 
actually incur these costs if contractors utilize government provided or 
government subsidized healthcare programs where they exist. 
 
The (Un) Predictability of Conflict  
Outsourcing during contingencies may be incomparable to outsourcing 
during times of relative peace and stability.  The unpredictable nature of a 
conflict environment makes writing contracts with enough specificity to ensure 
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goals are sufficiently achieved at a reasonable expense difficult.147  The multitude 
of unforeseen circumstances that arise during contingencies such as last minute 
situational or strategic changes problematize original outsourcing efforts aimed 
at cost savings.  Although outsourcing during OIF was generally pursued to fulfill 
“functions which the military does not have the capacity or capability to provide 
in-house,”148 rather than out of concerted efforts to lower expenditures, 
circumstantial changes the US was unprepared to address further impacted the 
reconstruction effort and dramatically escalated original contract costs.   
 As the security situation deteriorated, so did the reconstruction effort.  The 
US military does not protect contractors or government personnel such as 
contracting officers operating in Iraq.  This, alongside the military’s inability to 
quell rising levels of insurgent violence, amplified security costs beyond 
anticipation.  Project funds were reallocated to site security contracts.  The 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) estimates that by 
2008, at least $5.3 billion had been spent on private security services related to 
US funded projects alone.149  
Insurgents targeted project sites contracted to American firms.  When a 
sense of insecurity prevailed, American contractors suspended operations with 
the justification that site conditions deviated from those needed for contract 
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fulfillment.150  American contractors refused to work when security problems 
arose, yet their very presence instigated insurgent attacks to begin with.  Costs 
escalated dramatically when American companies subcontracted for site security.  
These costs were largely irrelevant when projects were contracted to Iraqi 
businesses since these sites were less vulnerable to insurgent attacks.151  
 Security concerns also hampered effective contract management and 
oversight.  For example, the Commission on Wartime Contracting found that 
“DCAA policies and practices…tended to inhibit travel by auditors outside their 
base of assignment for safety concerns.”152  Meanwhile, contracts were 
continually awarded for performance throughout Iraq, despite inabilities and the 
unwillingness to ensure their proper fulfillment. 
 
Subcontracting 
 Contractors used subcontractors extensively, contributing to higher costs 
and delays in the completion of projects.  Many big contractors bid on contracts 
before determining which subcontractors would perform the work and at what 
cost.  Once these details are determined, adequate subcontractor performance is 
not guaranteed.  Work on the Doura Power Plant contracted to Bechtel by USAID 
exemplifies this point.  Initially contracted to take nine months and cost $34.1 
million, three years later the work was still not completed to contract 
specifications and cost $121 million when Bechtel handed the unfinished project 
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over to the US Army Corps of Engineers.  Bechtel’s subcontractors would not 
show up at the site because of security concerns and several eventually 
abandoned the project altogether.153   
 
Conclusion 
The USG promoted outsourcing as a means to lower costs, streamline 
operations, and improve quality; and while DOD outsourcing efforts were 
deliberately initiated to lower costs, outsourcing during OIF was largely pursued 
in response to rapidly developing needs and insufficient government personnel 
available to fulfill them.  Costs were often unimportant considerations for 
officials actually involved in outsourcing.  In addition, personnel shortages and 
political policies inhibited the USG’s abilities to obtain cost effective and quality 
support.  Competitive contracting and contract management are critical to 
realizing the potential benefits of outsourcing.  Although the USG has 
acknowledged these important aspects of successful outsourcing, their emphasis 
has been inadequate when outsourcing for wartime support in Iraq.   
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Chapter 4   
 
US Outsourcing During Operation Iraqi Freedom:   
The Benefits 
 
 
In addition to its financial effects, outsourcing has significant impacts on 
personnel.154  Indeed, although DOD outsourcing initiatives are specifically 
aimed at cost savings, surveyed military personnel consider the impacts of 
outsourcing on mission performance and personnel of greater significance than 
cost.155  Warren Anderson, John McGuiness, and John Spicer surveyed air force, 
army, navy, and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) personnel involved with DOD 
outsourcing;156 over half of the 234 survey respondents opposed DOD 
outsourcing initiatives.157  One commander stated, “military forces must always 
be EFFECTIVE on the battle(field) and we are building organizations that are 
designed to be most EFFICIENT during peacetime.”158  This opposition to DOD 
outsourcing and the secondary nature of cost considerations likely contribute to 
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military leaders utilizing contractors without regard for their potential monetary 
costs, as illustrated in the previous chapter. 
Even if outsourcing can potentially realize some financial savings, military 
leaders are most interested in benefits beyond cost.  In a conflict environment, 
these benefits include rapidly acquiring personnel who already possess highly 
needed skills, focusing military personnel on combat, and investing host country 
nationals in local economic opportunities that deter them from joining 
opposition groups.  Political leaders are interested in utilizing voluntary civilian 
support to avoid instituting a politically infeasible draft.  This chapter will discuss 
these issues in relation to OIF. 
 
Speed and Specialization 
Although primarily pursued to lower costs, outsourcing may be motivated 
by considerations other than cost.  Businesses and governments often outsource 
to obtain services they do not have the capability to perform in-house or to 
improve the speed or quality of service provision.  Experts and specialists may be 
able to provide the same services better, faster, or at lower costs than in-house 
personnel.159  Speed and specialization are two oft-cited rationales for US military 
outsourcing. 
Contractors are a beneficial and necessary option when the military needs 
to acquire skills it does not possess, especially when these skills are needed 
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sooner than can be internally developed.160  Translation exemplifies such a skill.  
Contracting for translators is faster and easier than training or acquiring military 
personnel to speak a language at desired proficiency levels.161  It is impractical 
and unrealistic to think the military would, should, or even could maintain 
enough personnel proficient in every language to meet the needs of any given 
conflict or military engagement.  Communicating with the population is essential 
during contingencies, and acquiring interpreter services is nearly always 
necessary, unavoidable, and beneficial.162   
Contractors frequently operate, maintain, and repair complex weapons 
systems.  After World War II, the US military gradually increased its reliance on 
contractor provided weapons services alongside technological innovations and 
advancements that increased the specialization technicians need to maintain 
these systems.163   The military has utilized new weapons systems during 
contingencies before military personnel have been trained to operate them, 
making contractors essential to their operation and maintenance in the conflict 
environment.    
There is a dearth of information publically available that compares or even 
articulates the time it took contractors and the USG to arrive and commence 
operations during OIF; however, contractors were notably quicker than military 
personnel in providing support services in several cases.  The LOGCAP III 
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contract stipulates the contractor begin logistical support provision in some 
scenarios a minimum of 15 days after notification, while most task orders require 
further advance notice.  In practice, however, the LOGCAP III contractor (KBR) 
sometimes failed to commence work within designated timeframes.  Nevertheless, 
KBR was generally faster than activated military logistics support units, which 
took between 60 and 158 days to arrive on location during OIF.164  The military 
response took so long because reserve and National Guard units largely provide 
logistical support and these units take longer to deploy than active military units.  
This delay in the military response was actually due to purposive DOD policies 
that structured logistical support units in the reserve and National Guard.165  
Regarding performance, both military and contractor logistical support and 
supply activities during post invasion months have been cited for inadequacies 
and procedural inefficiencies.166 
Contractors may be faster than the government because contractors and 
government departments operate according to different guidelines.  Military 
logistical support and diplomatic security provide two examples of these 
operational differentials.  Contractors providing logistical support can acquire 
materials in the country of operation or from regional sources that the US 
military has to ship over from the United States.  In providing diplomatic security, 
according to the State Department, “contractors can be recruited, vetted, hired, 
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trained, and deployed in 90 to 120 days,”167 whereas the same process for State 
Department diplomatic security agents takes two years.   
The time differentials in these two examples may reflect OIF realities, 
however, they are not necessarily the product of inherent capabilities.  They are 
the product of politically determined policies and procedures.  If contractors are 
faster because they acquire materials from local or regional sources, why can’t the 
US military?  Why are diplomatic security contractors ready to fulfill the same 
exact security functions a year and half sooner than State Department personnel?  
Policies dictating materials sources and personnel procedures constrain 
government operations and in the process lengthen the time needed to fulfill 
them.  Contractors are faster because they do not face the same constraints put 
on the USG, constraints the USG itself enacted, restricting its own operations. 
 
Soldiers for Combat 
Businesses often outsource peripheral functions in order to dedicate in-
house resources to core functions.  Likewise, the DOD sought to outsource non-
essential functions and dedicate its in-house resources to core activities.  Which 
activities actually constitute the military’s core competencies is widely contested.  
The DOD has not comprehensively outlined its core competencies, nor has it 
officially articulated which services are essential to fulfilling military operations 
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in conflict environments.168  Despite these disagreements, at least one function is 
undisputedly military: combat.169  Combat operations are considered exclusive to 
the military and one of its primary responsibilities.  
Outsourcing wartime support services allowed in-house military personnel 
greater dedication to combat operations.  There may be significant unintended 
consequences associated with this redistribution of wartime responsibilities.  As 
Bilmes explains,  
in previous wars, military commanders had been able to relieve the 
heavy strain of conflict for their troops by temporarily assigning 
them to lighter support tasks (such as kitchen duty – the traditional 
“peeling potatoes”, or deliveries, construction, vehicle repair or 
custodial duties).  This flexibility provided commanders with a tool 
to help soldiers dealing with stress or who had experienced 
unusually heavy combat for a long period.170   
These support functions were outsourced during OIF, thus combat soldiers 
continuously conducted combat operations.  Bilmes suggests such continual 
combat has “contributed to the epidemic of post-traumatic stress disorder”171 
afflicting GWOT veterans.172  Medical research supports this conclusion; “the 
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frequency and intensity of exposure to combat experiences is strongly associated 
with the risk of chronic post traumatic stress disorder.”173 
Adopting business practices based on what appear to be sound economic 
principles may result in indirect costs that, over time, prove more costly than any 
initial savings generated.  Although it may seem self-evident that “to use a highly 
trained solder for peeling potatoes is simply not cost-efficient,”174 the long-term 
costs, such as medical expenses and disability compensation, associated with the 
physical and psychological effects on soldiers who endured such intensive combat 
may well exceed the cost effectiveness of strictly delineating potato peelers and 
combat soldiers. 
 
Contractors for Combat? 
OIF support functions have been outsourced to increase the availability of 
military personnel for combat operations.175  The US military is overextended and 
contractors played a crucial role in carrying out work in Iraq.  Contractors 
provided logistical support, construction activities, transportation services, and 
security services.  However, the presence of armed security providers, as well as 
other armed contractors in general,176 led to an obscure situation in which many 
contractors have clearly engaged in activities most would consider combat.  
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Retired US Army Special Forces Colonel Gerald Schumacher contends that 
given the ambiguous nature of “the enemy” in Iraq, oftentimes contractors need 
to act first.  Schumacher says, “when circumstances dictate they will not hesitate 
to open fire.  And circumstances require it frequently.”177  When lines like this are 
blurred, even when companies have formal codes and regulations dictating the 
use of force that conform to military standards of engagement, what constitutes 
defensive security versus offensive aggression becomes debatable.  The 
prevalence of armed contractors using their weapons contributes to their being 
deliberate targets of Iraqi insurgents. 
 Schumacher provides an illustrative account of how security contractors 
have played active roles on the battlefield.  When a contractor’s trucks were 
raided and confiscated by an influential Iraqi businessman while en route to their 
destination, the company sought help from a fellow contractor, as the US 
“military basically said that recovering them wasn’t their problem”178 and Iraqi 
police forces were considered either incompetent or even complicit.  In 
retaliation, the contractors raided the businessman’s office, stole documents, and 
kidnapped one of his employees.  The contractors proceeded to terrorize and 
humiliate their victim while negotiating for the trucks and cargo, and did so 
without notifying the US military or the Iraqi government of their actions.179  
Such contractor interactions with Iraqis have implications for the effectiveness of 
US military operations in Iraq. 
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 Conflicts like the war in Iraq are described by military doctrine as  “a 
competition for legitimacy between the counterinsurgent and the insurgent.”180  
Contractors can potentially delegitimize the US military and the Government of 
Iraq (GOI), as Iraqis see contractors as an extension of these powers.181  
According to an official in the GOI’s Interior Ministry, most Iraqis do not 
differentiate between contractor personnel and US soldiers.182  As such, 
contractor interactions with Iraqis directly affect the legitimacy of US military 
forces and GOI officials, and thus their abilities to defeat oppositionists, foster 
stability, and enable an environment in which the GOI can function on its own.183   
Contractor abuses of Iraqi citizens have been widely publicized.  Paul 
Bremer, as head of the CPA, granted contractors immunity from Iraqi law in 
2003,184 and as of 2010, “in over 7 years of activity in Iraq, no contractor has been 
convicted in a U.S. court of a crime against Iraqi citizens.”185  US civilians’ 
exemption from host country law is not uncommon, as the USG often retains 
legal authority over American civilians accompanying military personnel either 
by default when effective governments do not exist or as negotiated through 
Status of Forces Agreements with host country governments.  However, 
American civilians supporting overseas military operations “are not subject to the 
criminal jurisdiction of the United States, except those criminal statutes that have 
                                                   
180 Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones,” 11. 
181 Ibid., 5–6. 
182 Elsea, Schwartz, and Nakamura, Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, 
Legal Status, and Other Issues, 13. 
183 Ibid., 12–13; Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones,” 5–6. 
184 Office of the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Regarding the 
Status of Coalition, Foreign Liaison and Contractor Personnel, Public Notice (Baghdad, 
Iraq, June 26, 2003). 
185 Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones,” 6. 
76 
 
   
extraterritorial application.”186  Consequently, “such civilians can and do commit 
serious offences”187 such as violent or sexual crimes without sufficient or official 
consequence.  The USG has been notably inadequate at prosecuting such 
American civilians due to inadequate legislation and a lack of political will.  When 
contractors act, and in fact are, above the law, US military and GOI authority is 
delegitimized since these entities allow contractors to act with impunity. 
 
Host Country Employment Benefits 
 Establishing conditions conducive to economic growth and creating 
employment opportunities are critical contributors to maintaining security in the 
post-conflict environment.  Contracting can potentially advance these aims.188   
Military doctrine on counterinsurgencies emphasizes the importance of engaging 
the local population in reconstruction efforts, especially young “males of military 
age,”189 however; the US’s prioritization of Iraqi employment has been 
inadequate.  In 2008, Iraq‘s unemployment rate was at least 18%, while an 
additional 10% of working Iraqis were underemployed.  Fifty-seven percent of the 
unemployed were 15-29 year old males.190  Despite the supply of jobless Iraqis, 
third country nationals have been imported to Iraq to the extent that their 
employment by contractors has at times outnumbered Iraqis (see figure 13).  The 
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influx of foreign labor employed by foreign contractors was highly unpopular.  
Iraqis are stakeholders and engaging them in the reconstruction of their country, 
politically, economically, and socially, ensures their commitment to a better 
future and their rejection of the alternative.  
 
Figure 13:  DOD Contractor Personnel in Iraq by Nationality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source:  Adapted from Mosche Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, Department of Defense     
 Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis, CRS Report for Congress  
 (Congressional Research Service, 2011), 4. 
  
The US’s initial reconstruction effort focused on large-scale infrastructure 
projects, which were contracted to large foreign companies, in many cases 
American companies.  Although these companies subcontract out most of the 
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actual work to other companies, American, foreign, or Iraqi, these projects 
proved much less effective than small-scale contracts awarded to local businesses.  
Colonel Bob Bishop of the US Army Reserves, Special Forces, served in Iraq from 
April 2003 to March 2004.  He asserts “US contractors were slow and 
constrained by rules and regulations,”191 while contracts totaling less than 
$10,000 awarded to local Iraqi contractors were instrumental immediately after 
the invasion, providing employment and fostering good will.   
The Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) reflects Bishop’s 
assessment.  Military leaders on the ground identified a need for the ability to 
contract small-scale projects at the local level and as a result CERP was 
established in May of 2003.  The contracting process was streamlined and 
contracts of $50,000 or less focused on small-scale projects such as repairing 
damaged public buildings, bridges, and roads.  Through 2010, CERP contracted 
projects totaled close to $3.6 billion.  Although CERP funds were at times used 
inappropriately, “military commanders report that the ‘benefit received from 
CERP funds far outweighs the amount [of funds] provided.’”192  CERP illustrates 
the effectiveness of engaging locals in projects that contribute to the 
reconstruction of their own communities.  Unfortunately, CERP was relatively 
small compared to other US reconstruction initiatives. 
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Avoiding Conscription 
 As illustrated previously, personnel shortages were problematic 
throughout OIF.  These shortages existed in every government department 
operating in Iraq and included both military and civilian personnel.  Contractors 
were utilized in an attempt to fill this gap between the personnel available and 
the personnel needed to fulfill the objectives the US set out to accomplish.  The 
US military did not have enough personnel to sustain long-term operations in 
Iraq.  According to the CBO, “the demands of the deployments have led DOD to 
activate segments of its personnel it would not ordinarily tap”193 such as 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel.194  Military personnel have also been 
stop-lost, or “involuntarily retained” past their service agreements for 
deployments.195  Additionally, the army increased the length of many 
deployments from the standard 12 months to 15 months.  Replacing contractors 
with soldiers in Iraq would have been “impossible without reconstituting the 
draft.”196  Even after devoting more resources to recruiting, offering higher 
recruitment and retention bonuses, increasing benefits and pay, and lowering 
enlistment standards, the military has struggled to recruit and retain 
personnel.197  In 2005, for example, total active US Army personnel actually 
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decreased by three percent.198  In 2006, 49% of recruits were considered high 
quality,199 the army’s lowest rate of high quality recruits in over 20 years.200  In 
2007, the CBO suggested ongoing military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan 
might further inhibit military recruitment and retention since ongoing military 
operations increase the probability of deployment.201  
 Reinstituting the draft has little popular support in the US.  Gallup polls in 
2003, 2004, and 2007 found that at least 80% of adults have consistently 
opposed the draft (see figure 14).  A 2004 CBS News poll connected reinstituting 
the draft to the war in Iraq, asking, “Do you favor or oppose reinstating the 
military draft to provide soldiers for the Iraq conflict?”  Eighty-two percent of 
survey respondents said no (see figure 15).  Clearly, using the draft to obtain the 
personnel necessary to fulfill US military engagements abroad is not a politically 
feasible option. 
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Data Source:  iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public  
Opinion Research, University of Connecticut 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source:  iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public  
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 Figure 14:  Gallup Poll 
 Figure 15:  CBS News Poll 
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Given the strong popular opposition to reinstituting the military draft, 
contractors have been crucial to augmenting US operational capacities on the 
ground during OIF.  The US military has utilized its active military forces to 
arguably the greatest extent possible, even pursuing various options of last resort 
such as calling up former service members to increase its pool of deployable 
personnel.  Contractors filled in the personnel gaps that remained after these 
efforts were implemented.  Even with contractors at times outnumbering military 
personnel, the human resources devoted to OIF, in size and skill, have arguably 
still been inadequate.  
 
Conclusion 
 Activities directly related to an organization’s primary operations should 
not be outsourced.202  Surveyed management personnel from businesses whose 
outsourcing efforts proved unsuccessful and even detrimental often attributed 
their failures to wrongfully outsourcing essential functions of their operations.203    
Given the primacy of security during conflicts of insurgency, the extent to which 
the USG outsourced security services was problematic since it transferred the 
performance of essential functions to third party providers.  However, OIF 
outsourcing also enabled the military to acquire needed skills that it did not 
possess and arguably could not otherwise obtain.  Given the political framework 
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in which government departments operate, outsourcing in some cases proved an 
expedient option. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Waste, Fraud, and Corruption in Conflict Contracting  
 
 
 
 Numerous factors contributed to a contracting environment vulnerable to 
waste, fraud, and corruption.  The entire US contracting strategy, or essentially a 
lack thereof, negatively affected US operations in Iraq.  When contracting for 
reconstruction and governance support projects, the failure to involve Iraqis, 
incorporate their opinions, or consider the GOI’s capabilities inhibited successful 
contracting outcomes.  Inadequate contract management and oversight as well as 
poor contracting practices provided opportunities for wasteful, fraudulent, and 
corrupt behavior, in many cases without consequence. 
 
Institutionalizing Waste 
US Comptroller General David Walker offers the following definition of 
waste: 
Waste occurs when taxpayers do not receive reasonable value for 
their money in connection with any government-funded activity 
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due to inappropriate acts or omissions by officials with control over 
or access to government resources.204 
Waste typically results not from illegality; rather, it is largely the product of 
inadequacies, poor practices, and mismanagement more generally.205  Billions of 
dollars have been wasted because of poor planning prior to and during the US led 
invasion, occupation, and reconstruction of Iraq.206  Cost-plus contracts are 
notorious for generating excessive costs, yet the USG awarded large cost-plus 
contracts.  By failing to adequately include Iraqis or consider the GOI’s 
capabilities, many costly projects will go unused or inadequately maintained.  
Other contributors to waste in OIF contracting include poor oversight and 
government dependence. 
 
Poor Contracting Practices:  Cost-Plus Contracts 
Foreign and largely US based companies received large-scale, high dollar, 
reconstruction contracts.  In turn these companies subcontracted to American, 
Iraqi, or foreign companies who in turn may have further subcontracted to other 
companies.  A CRS report explains that “contracts won by U.S. firms had to be 
revoked and re-awarded to Iraqis”207 due to slow progress, poor performance, 
and excessive costs.  According to SIGIR, at least 15-20% of $21 billion in IRRF 
funds have been wasted.  Inappropriate contracting policies and procedures 
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contributed to an already precarious conflict environment, “and contractors took 
advantage of it.”208 
The CPA awarded 12 design and build contracts at a cost of $10 billion.  
The CPA utilized “design and build” contracts, wherein the same contractor both 
designs and builds a reconstruction project, despite the inherent conflict of 
interest involved when the designer is also the builder, as contractors often 
purposively design projects within their building capabilities regardless of other 
relevant considerations or manipulate a project’s design to maximize profitability. 
Contracts were awarded to large American companies that did not design or build 
projects that would have “had the best chance of taking root in Iraq’s soil, as well 
as its social and governmental institutions.”209 
These design and build contracts were cost-plus contracts.  Under cost-
plus-a-percentage contracts, the contractor is reimbursed for project costs and 
paid a percentage of those costs as profit.  Under such an arrangement, there is 
no incentive to control costs; rather, it is beneficial to inflate them.  Cost-plus 
contracts are reportedly awarded “in risky situations when the U.S. government 
is unable to provide sufficient information for offerers to accurately determine a 
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competitive price.”210  As such, under cost-plus contracts the government 
assumes all of the risk, which is supposedly necessary for contractors to bid 
because of the uncertainty involved in determining project costs.   
Paul Hinks, an experienced contractor whose company has worked on 
multiple contracts in Iraq directly for the USG and indirectly as a subcontractor, 
contends “cost-plus construction contracts in the contingency environment are 
not essential, nor are they in the public interest.”211  Testifying before the US 
Congress, Hinks said that in nearly 30 years of construction work, including 
extensive work in developing countries and in conflict environments, he had 
never even heard of cost-plus contracts until his experiences with USG 
contracting in Iraq.  Hinks goes on to explain the justification for using cost-plus 
contracts is unwarranted since contractors subcontract out most of the work but 
subcontracts are not cost-plus, they are fixed fee.212  Subcontractors are thus 
assuming the same risks prime contractors allegedly would not, illustrating the 
fallaciousness of the cost-plus justification. 
The USG is well aware of the problems associated with cost-plus contracts, 
and has been for quite some time.  Cost-plus contracts were utilized to procure 
manufactured products that supplied US military operations during World War I, 
resulting in excessive costs to the government and abnormally high profits to the 
producers.  At that time, cost-plus contracts were justified on the grounds that 
they encouraged companies to shift production towards goods needed for the war 
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effort without risk.  As former US Senator David Walsh concluded, “not only did 
cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts fail to curb war-profiteering; they 
aggravated it.”213  This outcome should have been obvious, “but in this as in so 
many aspects of pricing, hindsight is superior to foresight.”214  Nevertheless, the 
USG would award expensive cost-plus contracts during future conflicts.215    
During the Vietnam War, the US outsourced the construction of 
infrastructure projects such as highways and military bases in Vietnam.  One 
contractor, RMK-BRJ, fulfilled the bulk of the construction under a cost-plus 
contract.  RMK-BRJ was a joint venture formed out of several large American 
construction companies:  Raymond International, Morrison-Knudsen, Brown 
and Root, and J. A. Jones Construction Company.  Brown and Root is the 
predecessor to Kellogg, Brown, & Root (KBR), the largest OIF contract recipient.  
RMK-BRJ’s operations in Vietnam “developed into one of the largest 
construction efforts in history.”216  Between 1962 and June 1971 RMK-BRJ 
reportedly employed a total of 214,700 personnel in Vietnam.  This number 
includes 200,000 Vietnamese, 8,600 Americans, and 6,100 third country 
nationals.  RMK-BRJ’s Vietnam War contracts totaled nearly $2 billion.  A 1972 
report to the Committee on Appropriations concluded that “in addition to the 
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extremely high cost of maintaining a capability such as RMK-BRJ under a cost-
plus-award-fee contract compared with that of a lump sum award contract, the 
development of local Vietnamese contractors is also hindered,”217 as Vietnamese 
businesses could not possibly compete for the large-scale projects awarded under 
RMK-BRJ’s contract. 
 
The Global Maintenance and Supply Services Contract 
Iraqi Army logistical support has been provided through the Global 
Maintenance and Supply Services (GMASS) contract, awarded to AECOM in late 
2004.  As of 2009 at least $683 million had been allocated for OIF support 
through the GMASS contract.  SIGIR audited four invoices totaling $30.6 million 
AECOM submitted to the USG for payment under the contract.  SIGIR’s audit 
identified about $4.3 million as questionable due to the contractor charging more 
than prices agreed upon in the cost-plus contract, charges greater than market 
value, and for duplicate or triplicate work items.218 
Under the GMASS contract, AECOM ordered replacement parts for items 
such as army vehicles to stock a parts warehouse.  Although already permitted to 
charge the USG 18.27-22.3% more than the contractor actually paid for every part 
ordered, SIGIR identified a number of cases in which the mark-up on parts was 
much greater.  For example, coolant was billed to the USG at $25 per liter even 
though it was bought for $2.16 per liter.  This example is not negligible, as the 
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USG was overbilled a total of $1.7 million just for coolant on the four invoices 
SIGIR audited.219 
The GMASS contract exemplifies understaffing in contract oversight.  One 
person was dedicated to reviewing invoices submitted for payment under the 
contract, while the complexity of the invoices obviates the inadequacy of having 
just one individual verifying the charges billed.220  As SIGIR explains, “one 
invoice was about $24 million and contained over 11,000 line items for parts 
alone.”221  Identifying whether AECOM was overcharging for parts like the 
coolant was not a part of the contracting office’s review process.  Even if the 
appropriate amount of staff were dedicated to reviewing the $567 million 
invoiced to the USG for AECOM’s work in Iraq, charges such as this would still 
not be questioned, rather, they would be paid, and in fact they already have been 
paid.222  
 
Iraqi Involvement 
The US attempted to install foreign institutions and practices in Iraq 
without adequately engaging Iraqis in the process.  Throughout the US-led 
reconstruction, plans were often made and carried out without obtaining, and on 
some occasions in opposition to, Iraqi opinion and input.223  Consequently, 
SIGIR audits outline many “expensive projects that the Iraqis did not want and 
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cannot use.”224  The GOI has failed to maintain many of these projects, among 
others, after they are transferred to Iraqi authority.  A combination of purposive 
neglect and GOI incapacity has led SIGIR to conclude that the greatest amount of 
waste in the Iraq reconstruction process may be yet to come.225  
 Like with the cost-plus contracts, these practices have already proved 
unsuccessful during previous conflicts.  The US military, with contracted help, 
attempted to impose foreign institutions and infrastructures on Vietnam in the 
1960s and 1970s.  Contractors and military personnel tried to establish a 
“modern” South Vietnamese military, supplying equipment and teaching people 
how to use and maintain it.  Despite these efforts, soon after US support ceased, 
the “logistics shortcomings of the supposedly modern South Vietnamese military 
contributed to its rapid disintegration when the North Vietnamese advanced in 
1975.”226  The modern Vietnamese military the US tried to create was “not 
indigenously sustainable and was incompatible with the Vietnamese material 
culture and economic capabilities.”227  Vietnamese distrust of, and the perceived 
illegitimacy of, the foreign imposed institution led to corrupt practices and poor 
management.228  This example from Vietnam illustrates the importance of 
engaging host country nationals in project planning and implementation.  
Resources are wasted when the customs, capacities, and preferences of the 
recipients who use and ultimately maintain projects are ignored.  
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Depending on Contractors 
When officials did identify and document OIF contractor inadequacies, 
penalties for poor performance were rarely enforced.  Enforcing penalties 
incentivizes contractors to improve practices and procedures, while discouraging 
substandard provision.229  This lack of enforcement is partially attributable to the 
USG’s high level of dependence on contractors, which in some cases inhibited its 
willingness to impose penalties out of fear that contractors would not or could 
not continue to provide OIF support upon their imposition, as exemplified by the 
LOGCAP III contract. 
The military needed the support services KBR provided and had no 
backup plan for acquiring those services through alternative means.  As early as 
2004 this dependence was well known within government circles and within KBR.  
According to federal regulations, the government withholds 15% of subcontract 
costs billed under undefinitized contracts and task orders230 “to incentivize 
contractors to submit adequate and timely cost proposals in order to facilitate 
timely contract definitization.”231   The army violated this regulation as it 
continued to fully reimburse KBR until August 2004, at which point the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) declared the 15% withhold should be enforced 
because KBR had been requesting reimbursement for inappropriate costs.  Upon 
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notification, KBR told army officials the company would delay paying its 
subcontractors if the USG withheld 15% and that this “could create a severe 
disruption of vital support services provided to the troops.”232  A KBR official also 
threatened to sue the army as well as two contracting officials if the 15% was 
delayed.  Consequently, the army continued to reimburse KBR for 100% of costs 
incurred under undefinitized task orders.233  Although DOD acquisition 
regulations require the development of a backup plan to ensure the delivery of 
vital services during contingencies without interruption, the army had no backup 
plan for the LOGCAP III contract, which meant the army could not enforce 
penalties or terminate the contract and KBR knew it. 
 
Overcharging and Under Delivering  
As illustrated in the previous chapter, much of the potential cost savings 
from OIF outsourcing derive from labor.  Interestingly, contractors use the very 
same source to widen their profit margins.  Contractors increase profits by 
inflating labor costs.  An anonymous letter sent in May of 2005 to Colonel 
Theodore S. Westhusing,234 then director of Counter Terrorism / Special 
Operations (CTSO) activities in Iraq, outlines how this happens.  The contractor 
(in this case US Investigative Services (USIS)) bills the government labor costs 
for the number of trainers and staff outlined in the contract.  Meanwhile, the 
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number actually employed is much less.235  Poor oversight enabled such practices, 
which effectively increased contractor profits while undermining US operations 
in Iraq, as USIS’s contract entailed training Iraqi Emergency Response Unit 
(ERU) forces.  The letter to Colonel Westhusing illustrates: 
Every day that they don’t have an instructor on the ground means 
more profit for them.  They know that you and the COR are not 
going to check their numbers against what they are supposed to 
have.  USIS also thinks that even if you catch them, they will be able 
to argue their way out of it because you did not Define Instructor 
numbers under your SOW… It is a safety problem… We are so short 
of instructors that we are not really teaching anything out here… 
USIS still gets their money but you do not get your training… don’t 
take my word for it, actually come out here and ask!!!236   
The letter further alleges contractor personnel were not adequately qualified to 
train ERU forces, that third country national guards may have been illegally 
trafficked into Iraq, and that contractors killed Iraqi civilians while 
inappropriately accompanying ERU forces on their missions.237 
 The apparent lack of trained personnel necessary to oversee such large 
scale and extensive outsourcing initiatives resulted in ad-hoc, after the fact 
analyses of what went wrong, which limits the effectiveness of outsourcing in the 
first place and makes recouping losses practically impossible in many cases.  The 
USG paid contractors regardless of whether contracts were fulfilled according to 
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contract specifications and quality standards.238  Even when caught relatively 
early, contractors have received few repercussions for contract infringements.  
The USG has not pursued many identified cases of contractor abuse or poor 
performance because poorly constructed contract specifications lower the 
probability of recouping government losses through litigation.  As discussed in 
chapter three, personnel shortages and security concerns contributed to an 
environment in which “contractors had poorly defined statements of work, and 
the government failed to take timely action to remedy problems and in many 
cases was unaware of contractor progress and expenditures.”239 
 
Facilitating Fraud and Corruption 
Corruption can be defined as the abuse of a public position for private gain.  
Corruption often pervades conflict and post-conflict environments, as politicians 
and other beneficiaries prey on opportunities arising during and after conflict.240  
The contracting process for reconstruction activities, particularly infrastructure 
projects, is often manipulated to ensure certain contractors receive contracts in 
exchange for bribes paid to political officials.241  Weak and failed states are 
especially vulnerable to corruption; political institutions in these states are rarely 
capable of effectively eradicating corruption and the conditions that cause it.242  
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The degradation of political institutions during conflict and its aftermath may 
result in a weak political establishment.  
Containing corruption in post-conflict environments is essential, 
especially when conflict results in regime change.  If the populace considers the 
political administration corrupt, the post-conflict government lacks popular 
support and widespread legitimacy.  Further, post-conflict corruption inhibits 
foreign investment as well as institutional participation by the domestic 
population.243  These impediments to normalizing economic activity and 
economic growth further delegitimize the regime in a cycle that exacerbates 
political instability and economic degeneration.  
It is well known that corruption was the rule rather than the exception in 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime.  Being so entrenched, the overthrow of 
Saddam’s regime was not synonymous with the overthrow of corruption.  Social 
norms do not change overnight, even if the law does.  Hardly the liberated 
democratic government the US envisioned would rise from the ashes of war, 
Iraq’s post-2003 political system is endemically corrupt and has severe 
limitations in functionality and capacity.  Iraq ranked #2 on the Failed States 
Index in 2007244 and ranked 175th out of 178 countries on Transparency 
International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index.245  Iraqis’ perceptions of 
corruption were higher in 2010 than they were in 2003.246  Historical corruption, 
post-conflict conditions, and a fledging Iraqi government contributed to an 
                                                   
243 Ibid., 332. 
244 The Fund for Peace, “Failed States Index Scores 2007”, 2007. 
245 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010”, 2010. 
246 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2003”, 2003.   
Iraq scored 2.2 on the 2003 index and 1.5 on the 2010 index. 
97 
 
   
environment in which corruption thrived.  It is not unthinkable that businesses 
would exploit this political situation. 
 One Iraqi serving as a senior advisor to USG officials in Iraq anonymously 
testified before the US Congress contending, “the American government… has 
been complicit in creation of this culture of corruption”247 that has developed 
within the GOI.248  Through 2006, the USG had dedicated less than $65 million 
to anticorruption efforts, constituting not even .003% of IRRF funds, though 
fighting GOI corruption had been one of the USG’s stated priorities.249  As of 
2008, the USG had spent $6 billion developing Iraq’s energy sector but only 
$300 million developing GOI ministries.250  Adequate resources were not 
devoted to preventing and reducing corruption, while spending on contracted 
infrastructure projects increased opportunities for corrupt practices.   
In Iraq, wartime contracting facilitated the use of political office for 
personal gain.  According to Salam Adhoob, former chief investigator of the GOI’s 
Commission on Public Integrity, officials in Iraq’s Ministry of Defense would 
award contracts to front companies created by friends and relatives.  The 
companies would then deliver poor quality and insufficient goods and services, if 
they delivered anything at all.  Investigations by Iraq’s Bureau of Supreme Audit 
revealed numerous ghost projects, projects that existed on paper but not in 
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reality.251  By selectively awarding contracts, Iraqi officials used their public 
positions to enrich themselves, their friends, and their families, while 
undermining the reconstruction effort. 
OIF corruption was not limited to Iraqi officials.  Numerous high-ranking 
US military and civilian officials have been indicted for colluding with contractors 
in kickback and bid rigging schemes.  Fraudulent behavior thrived in an 
environment lacking oversight and coordination.  SIGIR’s Deputy Inspector 
General, Ginger Cruz, says SIGIR “investigations have uncovered bribery and 
kickbacks between contract officials and contractors, extortion by contracting 
officials, embezzlement, thefts of cash and equipment by officials and contractor 
employees, bribery of Iraqi officials, and fraud by U.S. and allied contractors.”252  
Private contractors, American, Iraqi, and foreign national military personnel of 
all rankings, government civilian employees, and nongovernmental organization 
personnel have committed these crimes. 
Iraq’s cash economy amplified opportunities for fraud and corruption.  
The CPA spent $12 billion in cash between May 2003 and June 2004.  In total, 
484 pallets of US currency weighing 363 tons were flown from the United States 
to Iraq.  According to SIGIR, this cash was spent without adequate financial 
controls or transparency.  Financial information and transaction records were 
insufficient.  Eight billion dollars were disbursed to GOI ministries without 
obtaining information on how the cash was spent and without ensuring it was 
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spent legitimately.253  The CPA’s lax attitude towards GOI spending, as well as its 
own, facilitated the entrenchment and normalization of corruption during the 
formative months of Iraq’s post-war political system. 
 
Conclusion 
 The extent to which OIF outsourcing has increased the prevalence of waste, 
fraud, and corruption cannot be precisely known.  Certainly waste, fraud, and 
corruption are not unique to the private sector.  Corruption is, in its nature, a 
political phenomenon.  However, the extensive use of contractors during OIF, 
alongside abysmal contract planning, management, and oversight, led to waste 
and contributed to an environment open to fraud and corruption.  Indeed, the 
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations, also known as the Gansler Commission, asserts that the army’s poor 
contracting processes, inadequate contract management (financial and technical), 
and inadequate guidelines and training “have significantly contributed to the 
waste, fraud, and abuse in-theater by Army personnel.”254  The high volume of 
contracts and the fast pace in which they were awarded provided ample 
opportunities for bribes and kickbacks in the process.  The prioritization of large-
scale infrastructure projects and relative neglect of government capacity and 
institution building weakened the GOI’s capacities to ward off corruption, while 
channeling funds into an industry known for its vulnerability to corrupt practices. 
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Chapter 6 
 
PMSCs and Conflict – Conclusions  
 
 
DOD outsourcing developed as the DOD strategically sought to transform 
its operations by adopting successful business practices.  However, the 
application of business strategies to military operations in conflict environments 
is questionable.  As Krishnan explains, “the objectives of war and business are 
indeed a far cry away from each other.”255  Or at least they should be.  This 
chapter reviews the relationship between private business interests and conflict, 
and how outsourcing to PMSCs potentially affects the duration of conflict.  
Additionally, the findings of the research presented in this thesis are reviewed. 
 
The Relationship between Business and War 
Historically, businesses’ attitudes towards war have varied alongside 
perceptions of its effects on profitability.  These perceptions vary between and 
within industries.  As Roland Stromberg explains, in the mid to late 1930s, 
businesses were generally opposed to the US entering World War II.  This 
opposition was born out of industrialists’ “fear of wartime regimentation by an 
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Administration they regarded as unfriendly.”256  That such a massive 
mobilization might induce “war socialism,” or government regulation of, or 
control over, private business activities was initially of far greater concern than 
the anticipation of lavish wartime profits.  By 1940 it became apparent that these 
fears were largely unfounded and industrial opposition to the war all but 
ceased.257  Concerns of “war socialism” were nonexistent preceding the invasion 
of Iraq, as such a war would not require the total mobilization of the US economy 
to sustain wartime operations.  Whereas Stromberg suggests domestic producers 
favored the profitable pre-war buildup in anticipation of war over actually being 
at war, which was still profitable but potentially complicated,258 war is only 
profitable for contractors operating in conflict environments when it actually 
occurs. 
 The notion that, “business corporations act internationally and 
transnationally, citizens of the world rather than any particular nation-state,”259 
may seem limited to its contemporary relevance, however, further investigation 
illuminates its historical applicability.  Businesses have generally prioritized 
profits over patriotism during war.  Consequently, unscrupulous wartime 
contractors have been objects of congressional inquiry before.  Previous 
congressional committees, notably the Nye Committee and the Truman 
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Committee,260 focused on the domestic industrial defense manufacturers who 
produce the weapons of war, not the contractors who use them.  Although 
domestic producers are still prevalent and relevant, contractors operating on-site 
in the conflict environment, at least in their magnitude, constitute a new industry 
of business interests.  
 The Nye Committee investigated American business interests and 
activities in connection to World War I.  Testifying before the US Congress, 
business executives admitted to raising prices because the government would pay 
inflated prices to meet urgent wartime demands.  The committee found that some 
American manufacturers’ wartime profits neared 90%.261  In 1935 the Nye 
Committee’s preliminary report estimated privately produced cruisers cost $1 - 
$2 million more per ship than navy produced cruisers, while the navy lacked 
personnel sufficiently competent in pricing to properly evaluate bid proposals.  
The committee suggested the costs associated with the auditing, monitoring, and 
legal actions necessary to ensure contractors did not over charge or manipulate 
their financials to gain excess profit, which were apparently common practices, 
were too high “to justify the continuance of private yards as naval contractors.”262  
When only a few contractors were capable of production, companies colluded to 
keep prices high and ensure an agreeable distribution of contracts.  Regarding the 
navy’s cruiser program, the committee contended, “if there were no 
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conversations about bidding… there was telepathy.”263  Although American 
companies have been characterized as patriotic supporters of the war effort, an 
ideal that has been applied to American OIF contractors, the record shows the 
opposite to be true.  Businesses have historically acted in their own best interests 
when the US has been at war, taking advantage of the government’s wartime 
vulnerabilities when feasible; as such, it should be assumed that OIF contractors 
are no different. 
 In the conflict environment, the ultimate goal of the US military is to 
defeat the opposition and foster stability and peace, while the ultimate goal of a 
contractor is to fulfill the contract, or as articulated in the letter to Westhusing, 
“the overriding thought is to make as much money as they can with doing as little 
work as possible.”264  The longer-term consequences of contractor misconduct, 
such as inciting discontent and opposition among Iraqi civilians, are not as 
detrimental to its overarching goals.265  Such misconduct may in fact be 
economically beneficial for some businesses, as further instability prolongs and 
increases the need for security services.  This is particularly true when oversight 
is lacking and contractor conduct and performance often goes undocumented.  
 In analyzing the relationship between business and war, Krishnan 
concludes that essentially, 
business has to be considered a parasite of war.  Business is not 
itself waging war and has no political stakes in war.  It rather simply 
profits from the fact that there is war or its possibility. 
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Nonetheless, businesses are integral to war.  Private sector products and 
services are essential prerequisites to waging and sustaining war.  
Although businesses are also contributors to post-conflict reconstruction 
and development, their services as such are predicated upon the need to 
reconstruct that which has been destroyed through conflict. 
 
Contemporary Connections 
Although not initiated by contractors, after war ensued, many have made 
significant profits from its perpetuation.  These companies are politically 
influential; they make campaign contributions, they have connections with 
people in the upper echelons of government power, and they employ former 
military and government officials.  Thus, while contractors do not wage war, they 
nonetheless influence the political system that does. 
 By employing former military and government personnel, PMSCs 
capitalize on the connections these individuals have with military and 
government officials.  According to the GAO, in 2006, 52 top defense contractors 
employed 86,181 military and DOD civilian personnel that had left their 
government positions since 2001.266  The GAO identified 2,435 as former high-
ranking officials, such as DOD “generals, admirals, senior executives, program 
managers, contracting officers,”267 and personnel in acquisition positions, while 
422 or more “could have been working on defense contracts under the 
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responsibility of their former agency, office, or command.”268  Seven contractors 
employed 65% of the 2,435 former DOD officials identified in the GAO’s study. 
SAIC employed 263 of them.  SAIC’s contracts principally performed in Iraq 
totaled over $191 million between 2003 and 2011.269  L-3 Communications 
employed 241 former high ranking DOD officials, while the company’s 2003-2011 
contracts performed in Iraq totaled over $1.4 billion.270  Highly decorated retired 
US Army General Hugh Shelton and former Deputy Secretary of Defense (1995-
1997) John White are on L-3 Communications’ board of directors.271  These 
examples do not even scratch the surface of the complex interrelations between 
government officials and PMSCs.  An in depth analysis of these connections is 
beyond the scope of this research, though these connections are an interesting 
and under analyzed area for further investigation.  Regardless of whether former 
DOD officials leverage their personal connections to help their private sector 
employers obtain government contracts, they bring insider knowledge on how the 
system works, which undoubtedly benefits the contractors that hire them. 
 
PMSCs and the Duration of Conflict  
 PMSCs are significant actors during war.  Their performance affects 
wartime operations.  Consequently, PMSCs impact the duration of war.  Upon 
arriving in Baghdad, retired American judge Arthur Brennan, hired to head Iraq’s 
Office of Accountability and Transparency (OAT), says, “a senior U.S. Army JAG 
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officer” told him “there are people here who would be happy to see this thing last 
forever.”272  Given the poor management, low oversight, and large amounts of 
cash in circulation, the environment was very profitable for some contractors, 
contractor personnel, government civilian personnel, and military officials.  It is 
not surprising these beneficiaries would not want OIF to end. 
 
Silencing the Opposition 
 TX Hammes contends outsourcing to PMSCs has decreased the ‘political 
mobilization’ necessary to wage and sustain conflict in Iraq.  Without contractors, 
the military would essentially have to double its personnel in Iraq.  The conflict 
has been sustained without the public support that would be necessary to commit 
double the troops.273  Hammes asks, “should we seek methods that make it easier 
to take the nation to war?”274  This is a consequence of replacing soldiers with 
contractors whether one considers the government’s use of contractors a 
deliberate attempt to bypass the public or an unintended byproduct of strategic 
outsourcing.  
 Not only do contractors decrease external (public) opposition to war, they 
may also decrease internal (within military ranks) opposition to war.  Going off to 
war is not what it used to be.  Contractors provide many amenities to deployed 
soldiers.  These amenities, such as hot meals made with fresh food, make wartime 
living conditions better than ever before.  According to one KBR employee, living 
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standards were better in Iraq (at least for Americans) than in America, 
comparing bases in Iraq to “upscale American cities.”275  He elaborates,  
most people in the states still have no idea what is going on over 
here.  I get offers all the time: ‘Do you need a care package, can we 
send you some snacks?’... We have… various American fast food 
outlets, lounges, free internet, coffee shops, and a large PX [that 
sells… junk food, steaks, etc., etc. – like a Wal-Mart].  Oh yes, and at 
lunch and dinner they serve Baskin Robbins ice cream out of large 
tubs, and once a week we get steak and lobster.276  
Created and maintained primarily by contractors, such facilities, in addition to 
other factors such as the extra pay soldiers receive while deployed and the 
voluntary nature of their service, arguably make war more tolerable for those 
fighting it.   
 
Counterproductive Contracting 
 Given the popular opposition to reinstating the draft, the extensive 
utilization of available military personnel, and widespread government civilian 
personnel shortages, contractors have been essential to sustaining OIF 
operations throughout the conflict’s duration.  As such, contracted support 
potentially prolonged US operations in Iraq.  At minimum, operations were more 
extensive than would have been possible without contractors.  Meanwhile, 
contractors have reaped the benefits of such military and government civilian 
personnel shortages.  As many of these contractors are American companies 
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utilizing foreign labor, “war in America has become a lucrative business, which, 
arguably, further diminishes the need for Americans to participate in it.”277  
Although profitable for a small minority, the public finances war.  As retired 
(1931) US Marine Corps General Smedley Butler explained, “the cost of 
operations is always transferred to the people -- who do not profit.”278  Whether 
wartime outsourcing aggregately lowers the costs of war remains unclear and 
uncalculated.  
Outsourcing reconstruction projects to large American companies was cost 
ineffective and as their presence provoked insurgent attacks, such contracting 
potentially prolonged the conflict.  This is not to say that “in-house” US military 
personnel should have necessarily fulfilled these projects or that insurgents 
would not have attacked US military personnel if they were working on the same 
projects.  However, insurgent groups propagandized contracts awarded to 
American companies, telling Iraqis “the big American companies are getting rich 
on your backs.”279  Had such projects been fulfilled by US military personnel, 
these claims would have appeared much less plausible to Iraqis enduring the 
hardships of the post-conflict environment.  Further, had these contracts been 
awarded directly to local Iraqi businesses, they may have increased the local 
community’s investment and participation in the reconstruction effort, perhaps 
consequently decreasing their toleration or support of insurgent activities that 
deliberately attempt to destroy it. 
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(December 2009): 21. 
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Conclusions 
 Outsourcing during contingencies can be beneficial and may result in 
lower costs, better services, or enhanced capabilities.  As when any business, 
government, or organization outsources, adequate contract management and 
oversight is critical to ensure outsourcing is indeed beneficial.  Although the USG 
purposively developed and promoted plans to outsource years before OIF began, 
outsourced support during OIF was largely pursued in an ad-hoc fashion 
necessitated by military and civilian personnel shortages, rather than out of a 
concerted and strategic plan.  This is evidenced by government civilian personnel 
shortages, the utilization of military personnel the DOD would not normally 
deploy alongside repeated and prolonged deployments, and inadequate contract 
management and oversight.  Indeed, contractor personnel have likely 
outnumbered US military personnel in Iraq for most of OIF’s duration. 
 The costs of outsourcing during OIF remain largely unarticulated, 
especially as these costs compare to whether such services were provided in-
house.  The USG does not have a systematic approach or established methods to 
compare these costs, nor have any significant or extensive attempts been made to 
appraise them.  CBO and GAO security service cost assessments each employ 
their own individual cost considerations, producing comparisons that do not 
include comprehensive costs and savings elements.  These comparisons are both 
highly limited in scope, analyzing scenarios within just one service sector. 
The USG can potentially lower costs by outsourcing wartime services when 
pursued through a competitive contracting environment, with effective 
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management and oversight with relevantly skilled and adequately staffed 
personnel.  However, as has been illustrated by government outsourcing in Iraq, 
the government can also waste a lot of money without achieving benefits in 
efficiency or productivity when outsourcing is done through inefficient 
procedures, without oversight, and by many different agencies at many different 
levels without coordination or unity of purpose.  The lack of a competitive 
contracting environment in many instances inhibited the government’s abilities 
to obtain the best services at the lowest cost.  In some cases the USG had few to 
no plausible alternative providers to replace poor performing or over charging 
contractors.  This enabled contractors leverage to maximize their profits and take 
advantage of the USG’s unpreparedness and contracting personnel shortages.   
Further, many military officials involved in DOD outsourcing are opposed to it, 
while contract costs have been of little concern to military leaders in Iraq.  This 
disconnect between the motivations behind outsourcing and their disregard by 
officials involved in its implementation inhibits financially beneficial outcomes.  
Inadequacies in contracting practices and procedures led to an 
environment conducive to wasteful, fraudulent, and corrupt practices.  The 
implementation of a reconstruction plan that, in essence, deliberately favored 
American businesses was ineffective and even counterproductive.  In working to 
reconstitute Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and facilitate US operations in the 
early months after the invasion, Ministerial Liaison David Dunford concluded, 
“there was much too great an emphasis on providing business to U.S. companies 
and not enough to finding the low-cost bidder or the best company to do the 
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job.”280  Large infrastructure projects awarded to American companies were 
unpopular and these project sites became targets of insurgent attacks.  
Outsourcing small projects to local businesses proved much more effective than 
large contracts awarded to big multinational corporations.  These small contracts 
were less costly and more popular. 
 Utilizing contractors to augment military and government civilian 
personnel can be both beneficial and detrimental to wartime operations and 
objectives.  Contractors can provide otherwise unavailable skills such as 
translation, while strategic reconstruction contracting can restore essential 
services, provide employment, and spur economic growth and recovery.  
Contractors can bring added skills to the table, but with those skills comes added 
liabilities for the government waging war.  As has been illustrated, wartime 
outsourcing, when pursued in an ad-hoc, uncoordinated, unmanaged, and 
uncertain fashion, can result in wasteful spending and provide opportunities for 
fraudulent and corrupt practices.  To what extent, which services, to whom, and 
at what points during conflict would outsourcing prove most effective remains 
unclear, and certainly no standardized application could ever be appropriate or 
effective.   
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